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Abstract
BRIAN C. JENKINS: The Bank Lending Channel and Monetary Policy
Transmission When Banks are Risk-Averse.
(Under the direction of Michael Salemi.)
I develop a model to study how risk-averse banks use excess reserves to manage risk and
how this behavior affects the way that exogenous shocks are transmitted through the aggregate
economy. My most important finding is that the model I propose in this dissertation generates
exogenous fluctuations in excess reserves over the business cycle. In particular, I find that
the model predicts that risk-averse banks will accumulate excess reserves in response to an
exogenous increase in loan defaults. This finding supports the hypothesis that risk-aversion
among banks was at least partially responsible for the substantial build-up of excess reserves
within the banking system during the financial crisis that preceded the Great Recession.
I also find that the model that I propose complements the financial accelerator model of
Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999). The Bernanke et al. model is the canonical framework
for representing how financial frictions influence the aggregate cycle and it is the foundation of
the model that I develop in this dissertation. It is a strength of the model that I propose that it
produces endogenous fluctuations in excess reserve holdings while still qualitatively preserving
the transmission mechanisms from the Bernanke et al. model that govern how variables like
output and inflation respond to exogenous shocks.
Finally, I use the model of bank lending that I develop to characterize optimized interest
rate rules for implementing monetary policy. I study several types of simple rules and I find
that in general optimized monetary policy rules feature a relatively strong response to inflation
and a muted response to output. These results are consistent with the optimized policy rules
that have been reported in recent studies by Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2007) and Kollmann
(2008) using modern monetary models without financial structure.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The financial system has long been known to influence how monetary policy is transmitted
through the aggregate economy1. Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) study the rela-
tionship between intermediated finance and monetary policy by embedding a micro-founded
model of non-bank financial intermediation in a dynamic new-Keynesian model. A monetary
expansion, in their model, reduces friction in the flow of intermediated credit, giving rise to a
credit channel or financial accelerator mechanism. By operating together with the standard
transmission channels, the credit channel amplifies the effects of monetary policy on the real
economy. The Bernanke et al. model has become the canonical framework for studying the link
between monetary policy and the financial system, but its exclusive focus on non-bank finan-
cial intermediation omits the special role of banking in the money supply process. Accordingly,
their model may incorrectly characterize how financial factors affect monetary transmission at
the margin.
Kashyap and Stein (1994) argue that a special bank lending transmission channel exists for
two reasons. First, bank loans are special and many borrowers are constrained at the margin
by the supply of bank loans. These borrowers cannot freely substitute between bank loans
and alternative sources of credit and are forced to reduce their asset holdings in response to a
contraction in bank lending. Second, banks themselves may face funding frictions that make
reservable transaction deposits a less expensive funding source at the margin than alternatives
1Gertler (1988) provides an excellent review of the early literature and Bernanke and Gertler (1995) review
some of the more recent evidence.
like large-denomination certificates of deposit (CDs). Funding frictions are more likely to apply
to smaller banks with less liquid balance sheets Kashyap and Stein (2000). But if sufficiently
many banks find deposits to be without close substitute, then monetary policy can directly
influence the supply of bank loans when it changes the supply of reservable deposits.
Empirically identifying whether a bank lending channel exists poses a challenging iden-
tification problem that arises, for example, because a monetary contraction may lead to a
reduction in both the supply and demand for loans, while bank balance sheets would reveal
only a decline in lending. With this in mind, Kashyap and Stein (2000) argue that lending by
banks holding fewer liquid securities to buffer against deposit outflows should be more sensitive
to monetary policy. They test their proposition using disaggregated bank balance sheet data
and find evidence of a lending channel: a monetary contraction does indeed reduce the supply
of loans by banks in the bottom 95th percentile of asset size. But these banks hold only about
a quarter of all assets held by the banking system. Therefore, while Kashyap and Stein find
microeconomic evidence of a lending channel, they cannot conclude that the lending channel
has macroeconomic significance.
One reason that Kashyap and Stein cannot argue that the bank lending channel is im-
portant for the aggregate cycle is that there is not currently a consensus theory of bank-
ing in the aggregate economy. Goodfriend and McCallum (2007) and Canzoneri, Cumby,
Diba, and Lo´pez-Salido (2008) have recently proposed interesting models of banking in the
new-Keynesian framework and simulations from both models suggest that the banking sector
contributes non-trivially to aggregate dynamics. But neither model, however, addresses the
complex risk-management problems that banks confront. The practical banking environment
is characterized by uncertainty and a theory of banking in the aggregate economy should
carefully account for how banks manage risk.
In this dissertation, I study the relationship between the banking system and the aggregate
economy in a model that emphasizes the practical banker’s risk management problem. I
use the model from Bernanke et al. as the basis for my model for two reasons. First, they
study a debt-contracting environment that allows for heterogeneity across borrowers, while
still yielding equilibrium conditions convenient for aggregation. Second, the non-financial side
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of their model is similar to the new-Keynesian models that are currently popular for monetary
policy analysis so that the marginal effects of the financial factors can be seen more clearly.
The theoretical contributions that I make in this paper appear as two modifications to
the Bernanke et al. model. First, I transform the non-bank intermediary in Bernanke et
al. into a representative bank that issues reservable transaction deposit liabilities and that
solves an explicit optimization problem. For reasons that I describe below, I model the bank
as a risk averse agent. Second, I modify the loan contracting problem in Bernanke et al. by
restricting the set of feasible loan contracts. Bernanke et al. model an intermediary that
avoids systematic risk on its loan portfolio by writing debt contracts with state-contingent loan
repayment conditions. I force the bank in my model to bear systematic risk by prohibiting
state-contingent contracts. Since the bank is risk averse and cannot write loan contracts to
escape systematic risk, it faces a non-trivial problem when allocating its asset portfolio across
loans and other assets.
I model the representative bank as a risk averse agent because I am interested in under-
standing what might motivate a bank to increase its excess reserve holdings. A distinguishing
feature of the recent financial crisis in the U.S. has been the dramatic and prolonged accu-
mulation of reserves by the banking system that began well before the Federal Reserve began
paying interest on reserves. I examine to what extent risk aversion can explain the sudden
build-up of excess reserves. Of course, by modeling the bank as risk averse I depart from
the typical assumption that firms are simply expected profit-maximizers. But my assumption
makes sense if a bank’s behavior reflects the preferences of its management. If the manage-
ment’s compensation were sufficiently correlated with the bank’s performance, then it would
be plausible that the bank’s behavior would reflect the preferences for risk of the management.
I call the model that I develop in this dissertation the “bank lending channel model” or
just simply the “lending channel model.” I study the implications of the model in two ways.
First, I use the equilibrium conditions of the lending channel model to compute simulated
impulse responses to various exogenous shocks. I compare the simulated impulse responses
generated from the lending channel model to impulse responses generated from alternative
models and draw conclusions about how the mechanisms of the lending channel influence shock
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transmission in the aggregate economy. Second, I use the lending channel model to compute
optimized simple interest rate rules for monetary policy implementation. I use the results from
this analysis to infer what consequences the innovations in the bank lending channel model
have for the characterization of optimized simple monetary policy rules.
The primary contribution of my dissertation is that the model of risk-averse banking that I
propose is sufficient to induce endogenous fluctuation in excess reserve holdings. In particular,
I find that in the lending channel model, an exogenous increase in the proportion of loans
that default leads to both an accumulation of excess reserves in the banking system and to
a contraction in the aggregate cycle. To the extent that a wave of mortgage defaults in the
U.S. led to the recent financial crisis that preceded the Great Recession, then the bank lending
channel model that I propose at least partially explains the build-up of excess reserves that
accompanied the financial crisis and the subsequent recession.
I also find that the lending channel model that I develop generally preserves the financial
accelerator mechanism of the Bernanke et al. model. The Bernanke et al. model is widely
regarded as the canonical representation of how financial factors influence the dynamics of the
business cycle and there is good empirical evidence to support the predictions of that model
Bernanke and Gertler (1995). For “standard” variables like output, inflation, and so on, the
impulse responses produced using the lending channel model are qualitatively similar to those
generated from the Bernanke et al. model. This is a strength of the lending channel model. It
preserves the desirable features of the Bernanke et al. model while also producing endogenous
fluctuations in excess reserve holdings.
Additionally, I find that the lending channel model that I propose here does in fact produce
the monetary transmission mechanism hypothesized by Kashyap and Stein (1994). Specifically,
I find that the mechanisms in the lending channel model amplify the aggregate effects of a shock
to the rate of nominal reserve growth. This finding lends theoretical support to the notion
that the lending channel transmission mechanism that Kashyap and Stein (2000) identify in
microeconomic data could be relevant to economic dynamics at the aggregate level.
After examining simulated impulse responses from the lending channel model, I use the
lending channel model to study optimized monetary policy rules. I find that my results are
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generally consistent with the existing literature on optimized rules in models without financial
frictions. I find that in the class of simple rules that I study, optimized rules generally feature
a greater than one-for-one response of the nominal rate to inflation and a muted response to
output. Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2007) and Kollmann (2008) reached qualitatively similar
conclusions in models without financial frictions and so my work shows that their results are
robust to model specifications featuring more elaborate financial structures.
In Chapter 2, I review the literature on the relationship between financial intermediation
and the aggregate economy. In Chapter 3, I describe the Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist
(1999) model that forms the foundation for the lending channel model that I develop. I
describe the lending channel model in Chapter 4. In Chapter 5, I use simulated impulse
responses to compare the dynamic properties of the linearized lending channel model with the
linearized Bernanke et al. model. Then, in Chapter 6, I use the lending channel model to
compute optimized interest rate rules for monetary policy and I compare these results to rules
computed using the Bernanke et al. model. Finally, I conclude in Chapter 7.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
I discuss the progression of ideas that has led to our current understanding of the relationship
between financial intermediation and the business cycle. I begin with a brief discussion of
the intellectual foundation laid by Fisher (1933) and Gurley and Shaw (1955). I then look
at the breakthroughs in modeling financial intermediation that were made possible with the
development of the economics of asymmetric information in the 1970s. Finally, I examine
how partial-equilibrium models of financial intermediation were eventually incorporated into
general equilibrium models suitable for policy analysis by Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) and
Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999).
2.1 Historical perspective
Fisher (1933) attributed the severity and length of the Great Depression to deteriorating
financial conditions that magnified the initial recession of 1929-30. He observed that when
borrowers are highly leveraged – as was the case in the U.S. leading into 1929 – even a
relatively small decline in their collective net worth is sufficient to produce a business cycle
contraction by causing a wave of credit defaults. The combination of credit defaults and
declining real activity depresses asset prices and borrowers’ net worth while raising their real
debt burden. This process leads to more credit defaults, further economic contraction and
ultimately deflation in aggregate prices.
Like Fisher, Keynes also recognized the link between financial stability and the aggregate
economy, but he did not emphasize the strength of the relationship to the same extent as Fisher.
Keynes understood investment to be an important determinant of output and that investment
is in turn sensitive to variation in the attitudes of borrowers and lenders Gertler (1988).
However, the students of Keynes who later advanced and refined the arguments that he made
in the General Theory deemphasized the role of the financial system (e.g. Hicks[1937]). The
two-asset theory of liquidity preference became the dominant framework for macroeconomic
analysis. Money became the key financial variable while the financial system continued to be
regarded only to the extent that the transaction deposit component of the money supply is a
liability of the banking system.
While the Keynesian framework dominated postwar macroeconomics, a small collection of
macroeconomists continued to study the relationship between the financial system and aggre-
gate activity. Gurley and Shaw (1955) proposed a theory placing financial intermediation at
the center of economic activity. They observed that developed countries tend to have more so-
phisticated financial systems with a greater variety of non-bank financial intermediaries. With
more non-bank intermediaries, the money supply represents a smaller share of the outstanding
liabilities of the financial system. Because of this, Gurley and Shaw argued that the supply
of credit is a more important determinant of real activity in developed economies than is the
money supply.1
While Gurley and Shaw recognized that financial institutions are important, theoretical
limitations prevented their theory from competing effectively against the rigorous formal anal-
ysis of Modigliani and Miller (1958). Modigliani and Miller showed that in an Arrow-Debreu
framework with complete financial markets, the structure of the financial system is irrelevant
for the allocation of real resources. Absent a comparably rigorous alternative theory, the result
justified the practice of excluding financial details from macroeconomic analyses by simply call-
ing all non-money financial assets ‘bonds.’ Modigliani and Miller’s conclusion supported the
Monetarist arguments of Friedman and Schwartz (1963) and helped secure the money supply
as the primary financial aggregate in macroeconomic models. The neoclassical economics of
the 1970s continued to downplay the significance of financial intermediation in the aggregate
1Brunner and Meltzer (1963) and Tobin and Brainard (1963) extend the Gurley and Shaw framework to a
broader macroeconomic framework for monetary policy analysis.
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economy.
2.2 Asymmetric information and credit markets
Akerlof (1970) pioneered the economics of asymmetric information. He introduced a framework
that makes it possible to describe financial market imperfections in a formal and compelling
way. Jaffee and Russell (1976) used Akerlof’s framework to examine the borrower-lender
relationship. They found that when lenders are unable to determine ex ante a borrower’s
default risk, the pool of potential loan applicants becomes increasingly risky as the lending
rate increases. With adverse selection in the borrower pool, the lender’s profit function may
not be strictly increasing in the lending rate. This can then lead to credit rationing if there
is an excess demand for loans at the profit-maximizing lending rate. By showing that adverse
selection in credit markets can produce credit rationing, Jaffee and Russell’s result was an
important step in developing a micro-based theory of financial intermediation.
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) extended Jaffee and Russell’s model to a richer contracting setting
where borrowers, once having received a loan, then have the option to undertake activities with
varying degrees of risk. From the lender’s perspective, the interest rate on loans serves two
purposes. It serves as a screening mechanism to confront adverse selection and it serves as
an incentive mechanism to control moral hazard. Like Jaffee and Russell, Stiglitz and Weiss
show that the lender’s profit function is not strictly increasing in the loan rate and credit
rationing may exist in equilibrium. Greenwald, Stiglitz, and Weiss (1984) obtain similar results
indicating that adverse selection and moral hazard problems are not unique to debt markets
and find that rationing may also arise in capital markets.
Asymmetric information is a defining characteristic of financial transactions. In numerous
partial equilibrium analyses, the strategic relationship between borrower and lender has been
shown to distort the equilibrium outcome of financial arrangements. However, partial equilib-
rium analyses, while suggestive, do not identify whether and how financial market imperfec-
tions influence aggregate economic dynamics and, in particular, the transmission of monetary
policy.
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2.3 Financial intermediation, the business cycle, and monetary
policy
Advances in the economics of information made it possible to build micro-founded financial
frictions into dynamic general equilibrium models suitable for policy analysis. Carlstrom and
Fuerst (1997) study financial frictions within a computable business cycle model. They build
on the asymmetric information literature by explicitly modeling the debt contracting problem
between borrowers and lenders. To introduce financial friction, they use the costly state
verification (CSV) model of Townsend (1979) and assume that lenders find it costly to monitor
borrower behavior.
Carlstrom and Fuerst find that in optimal debt contracts, lenders shift the burden of
monitoring costs onto borrowers in the form of an external finance premium. The external
finance premium is the spread between the non-default rate paid by borrowers and the rate
that lenders pay to obtain funds. The external finance premium is found to be decreasing
in the net worth of borrowers. Greater net worth reduces the likelihood that a borrower will
default and therefore reduces the monitoring costs that the lender expects to incur.
Carlstrom and Fuerst simulate the dynamics implied by their model. They find that a
positive shock to productivity drives up the value of existing capital on impact of the shock
and that borrower net worth rises along with the price of capital. Increasing borrower net worth
reduces loan monitoring costs, lowers the external finance premium, increases the demand for
new capital and ultimately pushes up output; amplifying the direct effect of the productivity
shock. Over the next several periods, net worth continues to rise even as the productivity shock
wears off. Because the response of net worth peaks several periods after the initial productivity
shock, the financial frictions produce hump-shaped responses in output and investment in
response to a productivity shock. This response pattern is more consistent with empirical
evidence than the responses generated by the conventional real business cycle model.
The Carlstrom and Fuerst model is an important demonstration of how credit frictions in-
teract with the real economy, but without nominal variables or nominal frictions, the model is
not suitable for studying how credit frictions influence monetary policy transmission. Bernanke,
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Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) incorporate Calvo (1983)-style sticky prices into a model that
is similar to Carlstrom and Fuerst’s. They find that financial frictions create a credit chan-
nel – or financial accelerator – mechanism that amplifies the initial effect of monetary policy.
On impact, a monetary expansion in the Bernanke et al. model increases output through the
standard interest rate channel. But since the monetary expansion pushes up real asset prices,
it also raises borrower net worth which increases investment demand and amplifies the initial
direct effect on output. This suggests that standard new Keynesian models may underestimate
the real effects of monetary policy by abstracting from financial transactions.
The Bernanke et al. model is the result of decades of research on financial intermediation
and its relation to monetary policy and the real economy. The model has become the canonical
exposition of the financial accelerator mechanism and forms the basis of the model of bank
lending that I develop later in this dissertation.
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Chapter 3
The Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist
(1999) Model
In this chapter I describe the components of their model and characterize its equilibrium. The
model economy comprises entrepreneurs, a representative household, and a government. The
household owns a non-bank financial intermediary, a capital good producer, retail firms, and a
final good producer. Entrepreneurs are a group of agents distinct from the household that use
capital and labor to produce a homogenous output called the wholesale good. Monopolistically
competitive retailers purchase the stock of wholesale goods, differentiate them, and then sell
the differentiated output to the competitive final good producer. The final good producer
bundles the retail goods to produce a composite output good that satisfies aggregate demand
for investment and household and government consumption.
At the end of each period, entrepreneurs purchase capital to use for production at the
beginning of the next period. Entrepreneurs finance capital purchases using their accumulated
wealth plus funds borrowed from the intermediary. The return on an entrepreneur’s capital
is subject to risk associated with systematic and idiosyncratic variation. To create a role for
intermediated finance, Bernanke et al. introduce a costly state verification (CSV) problem
based on the problem studied by Townsend (1979) and later by Gale and Hellwig (1985). The
intermediary observes the return on the aggregate capital stock, but only observes the return
on a specific entrepreneur’s capital by incurring an auditing cost. Under the optimal loan
contract, the intermediary only audits entrepreneurs in default and the intermediary passes
on its expected loan auditing costs as a premium on the non-default loan repayment rate for
the borrower.
The Bernanke et al. model is designed so that the asymmetric information between borrower
and lender is the only source of financial market friction. To ensure this, they make two
important assumptions about financial structure in their model. First, they assume that the
aggregate price level is set one period in advance so financial arrangements can be written
without inflation risk. Second, they assume that the financial intermediary in their model
is a non-bank lending institution. The intermediary is not subject to a reserve requirement
and so monetary policy cannot directly affect the liability side of the intermediary’s balance
sheet. With these assumptions in place, their credit channel transmission mechanism is easy
to isolate and, as I show below, also easy to turn off for counterfactual simulation exercises.
3.1 Financial intermediation and the demand for capital
The financial intermediary is a competitive firm that specializes in originating loans, processing
repayments, and recovering assets from borrowers in default. The intermediary funds a nominal
loan portfolio Bt+1 with one-period nominal debt liabilities A¯t+1 that it sells to the household.
1
At the end of period t, an entrepreneur j has accumulated real net worth N jt+1 that it uses
to purchase capital Kjt+1 at a real price of Qt units of the final output good per unit of capital.
Net worth N jt+1 is measured in terms of the final output good. The entrepreneur finances
capital purchases in excess of net worth with a nominal loan Bjt+1 from the intermediary:
Bjt+1 = Pt
(
QtK
j
t+1 −N jt+1
)
. (3.1)
The ex post gross return to the entrepreneur’s capital is ωjRKt+1, where ω
j is a disturbance to
the return of the jth entrepreneur’s capital project. ωj is i.i.d. across time and entrepreneurs
1Bernanke et al. define the intermediary’s asset and liability variables in real terms. However, in my expo-
sition of their model, I define financial variables in nominal terms in order to facilitate comparison with the
lending channel model that I develop below.
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with c.d.f. F (·) over a non-negative support such that E(ωj) = 1.2 While the ex post realization
of ωj is only privately known to the entrepreneur, the intermediary perfectly observes the ex
post realization of RKt+1 without cost.
The entrepreneur’s demand for capital is determined by its net worth and the repayment
terms of its loan contract for Bjt+1. A loan contract specifies a non-default nominal gross
repayment rate R˜jt+1. The repayment rate determines a threshold ω¯
j such that the entrepreneur
is able to repay its loan when ωj > ω¯j .3 Together, the non-default repayment rate and the
threshold satisfy:
ω¯jRKt+1QtK
j
t+1 =
R˜jt+1
1 + pit+1
Bjt+1
Pt
, (3.2)
where 1 + pit+1 is gross inflation between t and t + 1. By assumption, pit+1 is determined in
period t. A borrower in default surrenders the realized value of its investment project to the
intermediary, but costly state verification means that the intermediary incurs an auditing cost
when taking over the investment project. This cost is a fixed proportion µ of the realized
value of the project in t+ 1. Therefore, the intermediary receives (1− µ)ωjRKt+1QtKjt+1 from
a project in default. The parameter µ reflects a deadweight loss associated with debt default
and is the source of financial friction. When µ = 0, the intermediary incurs no auditing cost
and recovers the full realized value of a project in default.
Given QtK
j
t+1, B
j
t+1, and N
j
t+1, Bernanke et al. claim that a loan contract may be charac-
terized by the pair (ω¯j , R˜jt+1). This characterization of a contract is consistent with Townsend’s
(1979) definition of a contract in the costly state verification environment. Townsend defines
a contract as a “prestate contingent specification of when there is to be verification and the
amount to be transferred.” The threshold value for the idiosyncratic productivity disturbance
2Additionally, assume that F (·) is continuous and at least once differentiable satisfying:
∂h(ω)
∂ω
> 0,
where h(ω) ≡ dF (ω)
1−F (ω) is the hazard rate. As Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) discuss, this regularity
condition is important for excluding credit rationing from the debt contracting equilibria described below.
3Bernanke et al. define the repayment rate in real terms.
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determines in which states the intermediary monitors the entrepreneur’s project. And the
non-default loan rate determines the amount of the transfer from the entrepreneur to the
intermediary in those states where the entrepreneur does not surrender everything.
Notice that Bernanke et al. do not include Bjt+1 as a defining component of the loan con-
tract. The loan contract in Bernanke et al. specifies the conditions for borrowing a single unit
of funds. The entrepreneur then decides the quantity of funds to borrow based on the expected
per-unit cost of repayment. Since the repayment terms of the loan determine how much the
entrepreneur will borrow and how much capital the entrepreneur will ultimately purchase,
the optimal contract must still take into account the quantity of funds that the entrepreneur
will ultimately borrow. Therefore, even if a contract in Bernanke et al. is characterized by
the pair (ω¯j , R˜jt+1), the solution to the optimal loan contracting problem is the quadruple
(Bjt+1,K
j
t+1, ω¯
j , R˜jt+1) that maximizes the expected return to the entrepreneur subject to the
constraints that equations (3.1) and (3.2) hold and that the lender earns zero expected profit.
While the quadruple (Bjt+1,K
j
t+1, ω¯
j , R˜jt+1) is the solution to the optimal loan contracting
problem, Bjt+1 and R˜
j
t+1 can be eliminated from the problem using equations (3.1) and (3.2).
This means that the intermediary can determine the optimal loan contract by choosing the
pair (Kjt+1, ω¯
j) that maximizes the entrepreneur’s expected return subject to the constraint
that the intermediary earns a competitive return. Then, given (Kjt+1, ω¯
j), the intermediary
uses equation (3.1) to infer the size of the loan under the optimal contract. And then the
intermediary can infer the optimal loan repayment rate from equation (3.2). This is how
Bernanke et al. proceed in their analysis and I follow their approach in my discussion below.
The costly state verification problem in Bernanke et al. prevents the intermediary from
writing a loan contract that specifies repayment terms conditional the on ex post realization
of the entrepreneur’s idiosyncratic disturbance. But an entrepreneur’s ability to repay its loan
depends not only on the realization of that entrepreneur’s idiosyncratic disturbance, but also
on the realized aggregate return to capital. Since the ex post aggregate return to capital is
observable to the entrepreneur and the intermediary, Bernanke et al. allow the intermediary
to write contracts that are contingent on the ex post aggregate return to capital. This means
that in the optimal loan contract, the threshold ω¯j and the repayment rate R˜jt+1 are functions
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of the aggregate return to capital RKt+1. The entrepreneur is risk-neutral and so, under the
terms of the optimal contract, entrepreneurs bear all risk associated with the aggregate cycle.
Consequently, the intermediary bears only diversifiable idiosyncratic risk on its cumulative
portfolio of loans. Bernanke et al. assume that the intermediary can write loans that are
contingent on the aggregate state because their objective is to emphasize the macroeconomic
effects of asymmetric information in the lender-borrower relationship.
To solve for the optimal loan contract for entrepreneur j, the first step is to construct the
constraint on the intermediary’s expected return from lending. For a realization of RKt+1 and
a threshold ω¯j , a loan Bjt+1 provides the intermediary with an expected real gross return of:
[
1− F (ω¯j)] R˜jt+1
1 + pit+1
Bjt+1
Pt
+ (1− µ)RKt+1QtKjt+1
∫ ω¯j
0
ωdF (ω). (3.3)
After substituting equations (3.1) and (3.2) into (3.3), collecting terms, and requiring that the
intermediary earn no expected profits, it follows that the optimal loan contract must satisfy:
([
1− F (ω¯j)] ω¯j + (1− µ)∫ ω¯j
0
ωdF (ω)
)
RKt+1QtK
j
t+1 =
R¯t+1
(
QtK
j
t+1 −N jt+1
)
1 + pit+1
, (3.4)
where the right-hand side of (3.4) is the real cost of lending for the intermediary facing a
nominal cost of funds R¯t+1. The only variables in equation (3.4) that are not determined by
the end of period t are RKt+1 and ω¯
j . The threshold ω¯j adjusts so (3.4) holds with certainty in
all states.
Now, the entrepreneur’s expected real return from entering into a loan agreement is:
Et
{
RKt+1QtK
j
t+1
∫ ∞
ω¯j
ω dF (ω)− [1− F (ω¯j)] R˜jt+1
1 + pit+1
Bjt+1
Pt
}
, (3.5)
where the expectation is over RKt+1; understanding that ω¯
j is contingent on the realization
of RKt+1. Using (3.2) and reorganizing the previous expression, the entrepreneur’s expected
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return is expressed as:
Et
{
RKt+1QtK
j
t+1
(
1−
∫ ω¯j
0
ω dF (ω)− ω¯j [1− F (ω)]
)}
. (3.6)
The optimal loan contract is determined by the pair (ω¯j ,Kjt+1) that maximizes (3.6) subject
to constraint (3.4). As Bernanke et al. show, the solution to the optimal loan contracting
problem implies a capital demand function that relates capital expenditures to entrepreneur
net worth, the expected return to capital, and the intermediary’s cost of funds:
QtK
j
t+1 = ψ(st)N
j
t+1, (3.7)
where
st ≡ Et
{
RKt+1
} 1 + pit+1
R¯t+1
. (3.8)
Here, st is the expected real present discounted value of the aggregate return to capital and
is unit-less.4 Bernanke et al. show that the function ψ(·) is strictly increasing in st and
satisfies ψ(1) = 1. It can also be shown that for a given s, ψ(s) is decreasing in the auditing
cost parameter µ. Greater auditing costs raise borrowing costs and suppress the demand for
capital. The aggregate demand for capital is obtained by aggregating (3.7) over j:
QtKt+1 = ψ(st)Nt+1. (3.9)
Equation (3.9) reflects how financial market frictions interfere with equilibrium in the market
for physical capital. It is the first of two equations in the Bernanke et al. model that produces
the financial accelerator mechanism. In the absence of financial friction, µ = 0 and EtR
K
t+1 =
4This is because RKt+1 and
[
R¯t+1/(1 + pit+1)
]
are both in terms of period t+1 final output per unit of period
t final output.
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R¯t+1/(1 + pit+1) so (3.9) would collapse to:
st = 1. (3.10)
3.2 The entrepreneurial sector and the evolution of net worth
The entrepreneurial sector enters period t with capital Kt. At the beginning of the period,
entrepreneurs hire labor from a competitive labor market to combine with capital to produce
the wholesale good Yt. The aggregate output of the entrepreneurial sector is:
Yt = ZtK
α
t L
1−α
t , (3.11)
where Zt is an exogenous aggregate technology process. Note that Zt is a distinct process from
the idiosyncratic shocks to an individual entrepreneur’s return to capital. Lt is a composite of
household labor Ht and entrepreneurial labor H
e
t :
Lt = H
Ω
t (H
e
t )
1−Ω . (3.12)
The entrepreneurial sector sells its wholesale output to the retail sector at a real price of 1/Xt
per unit, where Xt is the gross markup of the price of the final output good over the wholesale
good price. During the production process, a fraction δ of the capital stock is destroyed. The
remaining capital is sold to the capital-producing sector – discussed in the next section – at
Qt per unit.
The labor inputs are paid their marginal products. The real household wage Wt must
satisfy:
(1− α)Ω Yt
HtXt
= Wt, (3.13)
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while the entrepreneurial wage W et satisfies:
(1− α)(1− Ω) Yt
HetXt
= W et . (3.14)
The aggregate return to capital is:
Rkt =
1
Xt
αYt
Kt
+Qt(1− δ)
Qt−1
, (3.15)
where:
1
Xt
αYt
Kt
, (3.16)
is the rent paid to the aggregate capital stock.
The entrepreneurial sector receives RKt Qt−1Kt from its capital holdings at the beginning
of the period. Under the contractual arrangements with the intermediary, a fraction 1−F (ω¯)
of entrepreneurs transfer a share ω¯ of their earnings to the intermediary while the remain-
ing entrepreneurs surrender all of their earnings. The real amount transferred from the en-
trepreneurial sector to the intermediary in period t is therefore:
(
[1− F (ω¯)] ω¯ +
∫ ω¯
0
ωdF (ω)
)
RKt Qt−1Kt. (3.17)
Using (3.4), expression (3.17) can be rewritten as:
(
R¯t
1 + pit
+
µ
∫ ω¯
0 ω dF (ω)R
K
t Qt−1Kt
Qt−1Kt −Nt
)
(Qt−1Kt −Nt) . (3.18)
Expression (3.18) reflects the aggregate real cost of funds for the entrepreneurial sector and
the term:
µ
∫ ω¯
0 ω dF (ω)R
K
t Qt−1Kt
Qt−1Kt −Nt , (3.19)
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represents the external finance premium on uncollateralized debt. The external finance pre-
mium is strictly increasing in the auditing cost parameter µ.
In order to ensure that entrepreneurs are bound by credit constraints in all states of the
economy, the entrepreneurial sector must consume enough of its wealth each period so that it
never accumulates enough wealth to become self-financing. Bernanke et al. do not confront
this with a model of the entrepreneurs’ choice between consumption and saving. Rather, they
assume that in each period, after settling their business with the intermediary, an exogenous
fraction 1−γ of randomly selected entrepreneurs close their firms, consume their accumulated
wealth, and exit the model. Each departing entrepreneur is replaced by a new entrepreneur
with no accumulated wealth.
Let Vt denote the equity of the entrepreneurial sector at the beginning of period t; imme-
diately after the entrepreneurs have concluded their relationship with the intermediary. From
(3.18), Vt can be expressed as:
Vt = R
K
t Qt−1Kt −
(
R¯t
1 + pit
+
µ
∫ ω¯t
0 ωdF (ω)R
K
t Qt−1Kt
Qt−1Kt −Nt
)
(Qt−1Kt −Nt) . (3.20)
Then, at the end of period t, the accumulated net worth of the entrepreneurial sector is:
Nt+1 = γVt +W
e
t , (3.21)
where W et is the wage income under the assumption that each entrepreneur inelastically sup-
plies a single unit of labor for production. Entrepreneurial consumption Cet is given as:
Cet = (1− γ)Vt. (3.22)
Now it is straightforward to write down an equation for the evolution of entrepreneurial
net worth using equations (3.14), (3.20) and (3.21):
Nt+1 = γ
[
RKt Qt−1Kt −
(
R¯t
1 + pit+1
+
µ
∫ ω¯t
0 ωdF (ω)R
K
t Qt−1Kt
Qt−1Kt −Nt
)
(Qt−1Kt −Nt)
]
+ (1− α)(1− Ω)ZtKαt H(1−α)Ωt /Xt. (3.23)
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This is the second component of the financial accelerator mechanism. Bernanke et al. find
γ that is greater than 0.9 in their calibration so net worth is highly persistent. Together,
equations (3.9) and (3.23) show how financial frictions distort the market for physical capital
within and across periods.
An alternative expression for determining the net worth of the entrepreneurial sector can
be obtained by noting that entrepreneurial equity at the end of period t also equals:
Vt =
[
1−
(
[1− F (ω)] ω¯t +
∫ ω¯t
0
ω dF (ω)
)]
RKt Qt−1Kt, (3.24)
where the right-hand side of equation (3.24) is the net realized income to the entrepreneurial
sector. The expression for entrepreneurial equity in equation (3.20) can be recovered by sub-
stituting equation (3.4) into (3.24). Now, by using the relationship between net worth and
equity given by equation (3.21), entrepreneurial net worth can be written as:
Nt+1 = γ
[
1−
(
[1− F (ω)] ω¯t +
∫ ω¯t
0
ω dF (ω)
)]
RKt Qt−1Kt
+ (1− α)(1− Ω)ZtKαt H(1−α)Ωt /Xt. (3.25)
This expression for net worth, while equivalent to equation (3.23), obscures how the mecha-
nisms in the financial accelerator model influence the evolution of entrepreneurial net worth.
In particular it is difficult to see how the monitoring cost parameter µ influences the cost of
borrowing for entrepreneurs. It is also difficult to infer the extent of the autocorrelation in the
net worth process from equation (3.23). However, equation (3.25) is important because I will
make use of a similar expression in Section 4.2 when I describe loan contracting in the lending
channel model.
3.3 Capital production
Capital is produced during the period by a competitive capital-producing firm. Immedi-
ately following production in period t, the firm buys the entire capital stock Kt from the
entrepreneurs and combines it with It units of the final output good to produce new capital
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Kt+1 that is sold back to the entrepreneurs. Capital accumulates subject to a convex ad-
justment cost. Adjustment costs induce variability in the price of capital and entrepreneurial
net worth. Assuming that entrepreneurs repurchase the entire capital stock each period allows
capital adjustment costs to be considered separately from the entrepreneur’s financial problem.
The capital-producer solves:
max
Kt,It
QtKt+1 − It − Q¯t(1− δ)Kt, (3.26)
subject to:
Kt+1 = Φ
(
It
Kt
)
Kt + (1− δ)Kt, (3.27)
where Q¯t is the price of capital in period t after production, but before new capital has been
produced. As (3.27) suggests, investment It in period t results in only Φ(It/Kt)Kt units of
period t+ 1 capital. Φ(·) is increasing and concave with Φ(0) = 0. The first-order conditions
for It and Kt are:
Qt = Φ
′
(
It
Kt
)
, (3.28)
Q¯t(1− δ) = QtΦ
(
It
Kt
)
+Qt(1− δ)− It
Kt
. (3.29)
Bernanke et al. assume that Q = 1 in the steady state. They do not explicitly discuss the
functional form of Φ(·), but for completeness, I assume the following form for Φ(·):
Φ
(
It
Kt
)
≡ 1
1− ϕ
(
It
Kt
)1−ϕ(K
I
)ϕ
+
[
1− (1− ϕ)−1]( I
K
)
, (3.30)
where K and I are the steady-state values of capital and investment and ϕ < 0. I assume this
form for Φ(·) because its first two moments coincide with the moments Bernanke et al. state
in the text and because it implies no adjustment cost in the steady state. Since Q = 1 in the
steady state, the difference between Qt and Q¯t is of second-order consequence and so I follow
Bernanke et al. and set Q¯t = Qt. It is straightforward to show that with the assumed form
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of Φ(·), ϕ is the elasticity of the steady state capital price Q with respect to the steady state
investment to capital ratio.
3.4 Retail goods, final output, and price setting
The retail sector comprises a continuum of firms that purchase wholesale goods from the en-
trepreneurial sector and produce retail goods by costlessly differentiating the wholesale output.
Retailers are monopolistically competitive and set the prices of their products according to
the familiar Calvo (1983) mechanism. Bernanke et al. introduce retailers into the supply chain
specifically to separate the price setting decision from the entrepreneurs’ financial problem.
The final good producer purchases the retail goods and produces the final output good using
a CES aggregation technology.
The final output good Y ft is a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate of retail goods:
Y ft =
(∫ 1
0
Yt(i)
(−1)/ di
)/(−1)
, (3.31)
where Yt(i) is the retail output from retailer i in terms of the wholesale good Yt and  > 1 is the
elasticity of substitution among the retail goods. The demand for each retail good is obtained
by solving for the minimum cost combination of retail goods to produce a given quantity of
the final good:
Yt(i) =
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)−
Y ft , (3.32)
where Pt(i) is the price of good i and:
Pt =
(∫ 1
0
Pt(i)
(1−) di
)1/(1−)
, (3.33)
is the nominal price index of the final good.
Retailers set their prices optimally subject to the familiar Calvo (1983) price-setting mech-
anism. In period t a fraction 1−χ of retailers are allowed to set the price of their good before
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any period t shocks are realized and taking the price of wholesale goods Pwt as given. This
means that inflation between period t and t + 1 is determined by the end of period t. Recall
that 1/Xt is the real price of a wholesale good so:
Pwt ≡
Pt
Xt
. (3.34)
All retailers optimizing in period t choose P ∗t to maximize:
∞∑
k=0
χkEt−1
{
∆realt,t+k
P ∗t − Pwt+k
Pt+k
Y ∗t+k(i)
}
, (3.35)
where ∆realt,t+k ≡ βkCt/Ct+k is the relevant discount factor and Y ∗t+k(i) is the quantity of retail
good i demanded in period t+ k. The first-order condition for maximizing (3.35) is:
∞∑
k=0
χkEt−1
{
∆realt,t+k
(
P ∗
Pt+k
)−
Y ∗t+k(i)
[
P ∗t
Pt+k
−
(

− 1
)
Pwt+k
Pt+k
]}
= 0. (3.36)
Finally, from (3.33) it follows that under the assumed pricing mechanism, the law of motion
for the price level is:
Pt =
[
χP 1−t−1 + (1− χ) (P ∗t )1−
]1/(1−)
. (3.37)
3.5 Government
Bernanke et al. model the government as a consolidated entity that has responsibility for
both fiscal and monetary policymaking. The government finances an exogenous stream of real
purchases Gt by collecting lump-sum taxes Tt and issuing base money M¯t+1. The government
budget constraint in period t is:
Gt =
M¯t+1 − M¯t
Pt
+ Tt. (3.38)
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Bernanke et al. assume that monetary policy is set according to a feedback rule for the nominal
interest rate:
r¯t+1 = ρrr¯t + ςpipit + v
r
t , (3.39)
where vrt is an exogenous monetary policy shock process. The government implements this
interest rate rule by appropriately adjusting the nominal money supply. Then, given contem-
poraneous realizations of the price level Pt and government consumption Gt, the government
chooses the necessary amount of lump-sum taxes Tt to collect from the household so that the
budget constraint is always satisfied.
3.6 The household and market clearing
The representative household has preferences over a stochastic stream of consumption, leisure
and real money holdings represented by:
Et
∞∑
s=0
βs
{
C1−σct+s
1− σc + ζh
(1−Ht+s)1−η
1− η + ζm
(M¯t+1+s/Pt+s)
1−σm
1− σm
}
, (3.40)
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the subjective discount factor and σc, σd, η, ζh, and ζm are positive
constants.5 In period t, the household consumes Ct units of the final output good and supplies
Ht units of labor to the labor market. The household uses real money M¯t+1/Pt held from
period t to t+ 1 to facilitate transactions in period t.
The household maximizes (3.40) subject to an infinite sequence of period budget constraints
of the form:
Ct +
Mt+1
Pt
+
A¯t+1
Pt
6WtHt − Tt + Πt + Mt
(1 + pit)Pt−1
+
R¯tA¯t
(1 + pit)Pt−1
, (3.41)
where Wt is the real wage, Tt represents lump-sum taxes collected by the government, and Πt
5Bernanke et al. actually assume the period utility function is logarithmic in its arguments; i.e. σc = η =
σm = 1
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denotes the real profit receipts from retail firm ownership. The gross inflation from period t−1
to period t is denoted 1 + pit. The household uses two nominal assets to transfer its wealth
intertemporally: money M¯t+1 and the asset A¯t+1. Money is a liability of the government and
pays no interest. The liability of the intermediary – A¯t+1 – pays nominal interest R¯t+1.
By letting λt denote the multiplier on the budget constraint, the first order conditions for
the maximization of (3.40) subject to (3.41) are:
C−σct = λt, (3.42)
λt = ζm(M¯t+1/Pt)
−σm + β
Et(λt+1)
1 + pit+1
, (3.43)
ζh(1−Ht)−η = λtwt, (3.44)
λt = β
Et(λt+1R¯t+1)
1 + pit+1
. (3.45)
These conditions can be rewritten to eliminate λt:
ζh(1−Ht)−η = C−σCt Wt, (3.46)(
M¯t+1
Pt
)σm
= ζmC
σc
t
(
R¯t+1 − 1
R¯t+1
)−1
, (3.47)
C−σct = β
R¯t+1
1 + pit+1
Et(C
−σc
t ). (3.48)
Then, the aggregate goods market must clear:
Y ft = Ct + C
e
t + It +Gt + µR
K
t Qt−1Kt
∫ ω¯
0
ω dF (ω), (3.49)
and the quantity of differentiated final goods produced must equal the quantity of wholesale
goods:
Y ft = Yt. (3.50)
25
Finally, the intermediary’s balance sheet must balance:
Bt+1 = A¯t+1, (3.51)
so that the amount of the asset A¯t+1 held by the household equals borrowing Bt+1 by the
entrepreneurs.
3.7 Linearized equilibrium conditions
Here I describe equilibrium in the Bernanke et al. framework. I present 13 linearized equi-
librium conditions describing the evolution of 13 endogenous variables. Lowercase variables
are in log-deviations from the steady state and capital letters denote steady state values. The
variables φyt , φ
ce
t , and φ
n
t collect terms that, according to Bernanke et al., do not affect the
dynamics under a reasonably general set of parameterizations. The set equilibrium conditions
are:
0 =
C
Y
ct +
I
Y
it +
G
Y
gt +
Ce
Y
cet − yt + φyt (3.52)
σcEtct+1 − (r¯t+1 − pit+1) = σcct (3.53)
− 1
R¯− 1 r¯t+1 = σmmt+1 − σcct (3.54)
γ−1(1− γ)N
Ce
nt+1 = c
e
t − φc
e
t (3.55)
r¯t+1 = ρrr¯t + ςpipit + v
r
t (3.56)
Etr
K
t+1 − (r¯t+1 − pit+1) + ν−1 (nt+1 − qt) = ν−1kt+1 (3.57)
ϑqt = r
K
t + (1− ϑ) (xt + kt − yt) + qt−1 (3.58)
qt = ϕ(it − kt) (3.59)
0 = zt + αkt − yt + (1− α)Ωht (3.60)
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0 = yt − (1 + (η − 1)H) (1−H)−1 ht − σcct − xt (3.61)
kt+1 = δit + (1− δ) kt (3.62)
−κEtxt+1 + βEtpit+2 = pit+1 (3.63)
nt+1 =
γR¯K
N
rKt +
(
γR¯− γR¯K
N
)
(r¯t − pit) + γR¯nt + φnt (3.64)
where:
φyt ≡
DK
Y
log
(
µRKt Qt−1KtE(ω|ω 6 ω¯t)/DK)
)
φc
e
t ≡ −
γ−1(1− γ)(1− α)(1− Ω)Y
CeX
(yt − xt)
φnt ≡
γK
N
(RK − R¯)(qt−1 + kt) + (1− α)(1− Ω)Y
X
(yt − xt)
+ γDK log
(
µRKt Qt−1KtE(ω|ω 6 ω¯t)/DK)
)
and:
D ≡ µE(ω|ω 6 ω¯)
ν ≡ ψ
′(RK/R¯)
ψ(RK/R¯)
RK
R¯
ϑ ≡ 1− δ
αY/XK + 1− δ
ϕ ≡ Φ
′′(I/K)
Φ′(I/K)
I
K
κ ≡ (1− θ)(1− βθ)
θ
Equation (3.52) is the linearized aggregate resource constraint and (3.53) is the household’s
consumption Euler equation. Notice that since inflation and the nominal rate are predeter-
mined at date t, the household saves at the real risk-free rate. Equation (3.54) is the household’s
demand for real money. Equation (3.55) links entrepreneurial consumption to net worth. With
the parameter values that Bernanke et al. use for their computational analysis, the coefficient
on net worth is close to 1 so that movements in entrepreneurial net worth are closely matched
by movements in entrepreneurial consumption. Equation (3.56) is the monetary policy rule
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for the nominal interest rate.
Equation (3.57) is a linearized version of the entrepreneur’s demand for capital. Financial
market frictions create a spread between the expected return to capital Etr
K
t+1 and the real
cost of funds for the intermediary r¯t+1 − pit+1. Other things equal, this spread narrows with
higher entrepreneurial net worth and lower capital prices. When credit frictions are removed
– i.e. µ = 0 – equation (3.57) becomes:
Etr
K
t+1 = r¯t+1 − pit+1. (3.65)
Next, equation (3.58) is the linearized return to capital. Equation (3.59) is the first order
condition of the capital producer and it links the price of capital to movement in investment and
the capital stock. Equation (3.60) is the linearized production function and (3.61) combines
the household’s first-order condition for supplying labor with the marginal product of labor.
The evolution of capital is represented by (3.62). And equation (3.63) is a version of the new
Keynesian Phillips curve. This is the same equation that appears in Bernanke et al. except that
I have iterated it forward one period. Notice that while the Philips curve is forward-looking,
inflation is determined one period in advance.
Equation (3.64) describes how entrepreneurial net worth evolves. Net worth is increasing
in the previous period’s return to capital rKt and decreasing in the real cost of loanable funds
r¯t − pit. In plausible parameterizations, the product γR¯ is close to – but less than – 1 so
fluctuations in net worth are highly persistent. This equation appears different from what is
given in Bernanke et al. because I have taken care to write out the full linearization of the net
worth equation.
Finally, the three exogenous variables – government consumption gt, aggregate productivity
zt, and the monetary policy shock v
r
t – are AR(1) processes:
gt = ρggt−1 + ε
g
t , (3.66)
zt = ρzzt−1 + εzt , (3.67)
vrt = ρvv
r
t−1 + ε
r
t . (3.68)
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where εgt , ε
z
t , and ε
r
t are i.i.d. disturbances. This concludes the description of the equilibrium
in the basic Bernanke et al. model.
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Chapter 4
A Model of the Bank Lending Channel
In this chapter, I build a bank lending channel into the Bernanke et al. framework. I replace
the simple financial intermediary in their model with a risk averse representative bank that
solves a non-trivial intertemporal optimization problem. Specifically, I model the bank as if it
were operated by an agent called a banker who receives a flow of utility in each period that
is a concave function of the bank’s period profits. Each period, the banker maximizes the
discounted sum of its expected lifetime period utilities by acquiring an asset portfolio using
funds obtained by issuing reservable deposit liabilities. There are three assets available to the
bank: loans to entrepreneurs, loans to other banks on the interbank market, and reserves held
on account with the central bank.
In the model, the central bank requires the bank to hold a minimum quantity of reserves
against its deposits. While the central bank does not pay interest on reserves, the bank still
finds it useful to hold reserves in excess of the minimum required for three reasons. First,
because the bank is risk averse, it uses excess reserves as a tool for managing the riskiness
of its asset portfolio. When confronted with an exogenous increase in the volatility of the
return on its loan portfolio, the bank increases the share of excess reserves in its overall asset
portfolio. This reduces the volatility of the return on the overall asset portfolio but also reduces
the expected return on the portfolio.
Second, the bank uses real resources to originate loans and by holding excess reserves,
the bank reduces its marginal cost of lending. In practice, excess reserve holdings keep the
asset side of bank balance sheets liquid at the margin. Some banks hold excess reserves to
more easily accommodate unanticipated deposit outflows Kashyap and Stein (1995).1 I avoid
unnecessary complication by not explicitly modeling intra-period deposit fluctuations. Instead,
I assume that excess reserves, along with labor, are arguments in a production function for
loans; giving the bank incentive to hold excess reserves in the nonstochastic steady state. This
is consistent with the long-run behavior of the banking system and enables me to approximate
the model around a steady state with positive excess reserves.
Third, the banker’s optimization problem gives rise to a motive for intertemporal “return-
smoothing.” In a given period, the bank’s profit is determined by the net return from the
portfolio it originated in the previous period less the cost of originating new loans that will
mature in the following period. If the return on the bank’s portfolio from the previous period is
unexpectedly low, the banker increases excess reserve holdings to reduce the costs of originating
new loans. This also reduces the bank’s period-ahead profits because excess reserves do not
earn interest. In effect, the banker uses excess reserves to borrow against its future profits.
The bank’s loan portfolio is a collection of loans to individual entrepreneurs. The bank
writes a unique loan contract for each entrepreneur. A loan contract is characterized by a
nominal principal and a fixed nominal repayment rate. Each entrepreneur uses its borrowed
funds to invest in a capital project. Individual capital projects earn a nominal return that is
subject to both idiosyncratic and systematic variation. If an entrepreneur cannot fully repay
its loan, it defaults and the bank recovers the entrepreneur’s capital project minus an auditing
cost. Since the ability of an entrepreneur to repay its loan depends on the ex post realization of
the aggregate state, the ex post real return on the bank’s portfolio of loans is open to aggregate
risk.
1This motive for holding excess reserves is quantitatively weak given the highly liquid markets for T-
bills and other money market instruments. Between January 1959 and August 2008, the ratio of excess
reserves held by U.S. depository institutions to the demand deposit component of M1 was 0.0031. Data
Source: FRED, Federal Reserve Economic Data, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis: Currency Compo-
nent of M1 [CURRSL] ; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System: H.6 Money Stock Measures;
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/CURRSL; Excess Reserves of Depository Institutions [EXCRESNS]
; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System: H.3 Aggregate Reserves of Depository Institutions and
the Monetary Base; http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/EXCRESNS; accessed August 13, 2010.
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In contrast to the model that I develop, Bernanke et al. study a loan contracting envi-
ronment that permits the financial intermediary to escape aggregate risk. The intermedi-
ary in their model writes state-contingent loan contracts that shift all aggregate risk onto
entrepreneurs. Allowing for state-contingent contracts simplifies the solution to their loan
contracting problem but abstracts from an important characteristic of the practical banking
environment. In practice, banks cannot perfectly shield their asset returns from fluctuations
in the aggregate cycle and I have adopted a modeling strategy to reflect this.
The bank that I model acquires funds by accepting deposits from the household. In practice,
banks do not choose the quantity of deposits that they accept. Instead, they set a deposit
rate and receive any deposits that are forthcoming. Banks indirectly influence the amount of
deposits they receive by manipulating the deposit rate. Even so, the practical banker cannot
claim to control the quantity of deposits on its balance sheet.
In contrast to the practical banking environment, the bank that I model never confronts
unexpected intra-period deposit withdrawals. Deposits have the same maturity as bank loans
and so the bank easily adjusts its asset holdings in response to fluctuations in deposit avail-
ability. Furthermore, the bank understands the structure of the model economy and knows
with certainty the quantity of deposits it will attract at each deposit rate. Because of this, I
solve the bank’s problem as if it chooses deposits directly, but the results would be unchanged
if I gave the bank control over the deposit rate instead.
Finally, I introduce a market for interbank loans. Each period, the bank chooses a net
position on the interbank market. Clearing requires that the net positions of all banks sum
to zero: the banking system cannot be a net borrower or lender to itself. Since I model
the decisions of a representative bank, the interbank market clears only if interbank lending
does not occur in equilibrium. Nonetheless, I can still define and characterize an equilibrium
interbank lending rate.2
2In the present paper, I will follow Bernanke et al. and adopt the conventional assumption that the central
bank’s policy instrument is the one-period nominal risk-free rate determined by the household’s consumption
Euler equation. But historically, the instrument of monetary policy in the U.S. has been the overnight interbank
rate. In the future, it may be worthwhile to compare the effectiveness of monetary policy in the model under
alternative assumptions about which rate is the policy instrument.
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The next three sections below describe the novel components of my model environment.
The remaining sections contain components of the model that are either identical or similar
to components of the Bernanke et al. model.
4.1 Banking
At the end of period t, a representative bank chooses a nominal amount Bt+1 to lend to
entrepreneurs, a quantity of deposits Dt+1 to accept from households, a net position on the
interbank lending market Bfft+1, and total reserve holdings Mt+1. The bank’s balance sheet
constraint going into period t+ 1 is:
Bt+1 +B
ff
t+1 +Mt+1 = Dt+1. (4.1)
The bank is required to hold a minimum amount of reserves M reqt+1 on account with the central
bank:
M reqt+1 = ρDt+1, (4.2)
where ρ is the required reserve ratio. The supply of central bank reserves Mt+1 must satisfy:
Mt+1 = M
req
t+1 +M
ex
t+1, (4.3)
where M ext+1 is the bank’s excess reserve holdings.
The bank employs household labor and uses excess reserves to originate a loan portfolio.
Let Hb,t be the labor employed by the bank. For a given level of excess reserve holdings, the
amount of labor required to originate the real portfolio Bt+1/Pt is determined by:
Bt+1
Pt
= Zb × (Hb,t)αb
[
M ext+1
Pt
]γb
, (4.4)
where Zb > 0 is a scalar, αb, γb ∈ [0, 1) such that αb+γb 6 1, and Pt is the nominal price level
of the final output good Y ft defined below. In the present model, all financial instruments have
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a one-period maturity. Equation (4.4) captures the bank’s motive for holding excess reserves
to buffer against deposit withdrawals. Note that equation (4.4) does not define a one-to-one
correspondence between excess reserves and loans. Instead, the bank freely chooses the size
of its loan portfolio and the amount of its excess reserve holdings, and then varies how much
labor it employs so that equation (4.4) is satisfied.
By itself, equation (4.4) might suggest that the bank can increase its loan holdings by either
holding more excess reserves or by hiring additional labor. However, this is not the case. The
loan production function should not be considered separately from the bank’s balance sheet
identity represented by equation (4.1). The bank’s total asset holdings are constrained by the
availability of deposits. The loan production function informs the bank’s decision about how
to balance its asset portfolio between loans and excess reserves.
For a given real wage Wt, (4.4) implies a cost function for producing loans Bt+1/Pt:
C
(
Bt+1
Pt
,
M ext+1
Pt
,Wt
)
= Wt
[
1
Zb
Bt+1
Pt
] 1
αb ×
[
M ext+1
Pt
]− γb
αb
. (4.5)
As the cost function indicates, increasing excess reserve holdings reduces both the total cost
and marginal cost of lending. The cost of lending is increasing in the real wage.
Let Φ¯t denote the bank’s real period t profit:
Φ¯t ≡ 1
1 + pit
[
RBt
Bt
Pt−1
+Rfft
Bfft
Pt−1
+
Mt
Pt−1
−RDt
Dt
Pt−1
]
− C
(
Bt+1
Pt
,
M ext+1
Pt
,Wt
)
, (4.6)
where RBt is the stochastic gross nominal return on the loan portfolio with face value Bt, R
D
t
is gross the nominal deposit rate and Rfft is the gross rate on interbank loans.
The bank is operated by a risk-averse member of the household called a banker.3 The
banker has concave preferences over real period profits denoted by u˜(·). The banker maximizes
the present discounted value of its expected utility by choosing Bt+1/Pt, B
ff
t+1/Pt, Mt+1/Pt,
3This assumption is appropriate if, even as a member of the household, the banker’s consumption is correlated
with the performance of the bank. In practice, a bank may be expected to behave as if it were operated by
risk-averse management if the management’s compensation is tied to the bank’s period profits.
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M ext+1/Pt, and Dt+1/Pt to solve:
maxEt
∞∑
s=0
βsu˜
(
Φ¯t+s
)
. (4.7)
For convenience, I suppose that the banker’s subjective discount factor β is the same as the
rest of the household’s. I assume the following functional form for the banker’s preferences:
u˜(Φ¯) = − exp(ξ1 − ξ0Φ¯), where ξ0 is a positive constant and ξ1 is a real-valued constant.
Under this specification, the banker’s preferences are defined over all real profit realizations.
The bank may receive negative profits in a period because I assume that the household absorbs
any loss the bank incurs in a period where the return on its asset portfolio is inadequate to
meet the bank’s deposit liabilities and loan origination costs. This allows me abstract from the
details of bank failure and specify the return on deposits as being risk-free without explicitly
modeling intermediated deposit insurance.
The bank solves (4.7) subject to (4.1), (4.2), and (4.3). After substituting the constraints
into (4.6), I write Φ¯t in terms of Bt+1/Pt, Dt+1/Pt, and M
ex
t+1/Pt only:
Φ¯t =
1
1 + pit
[(
RBt −Rfft
) Bt
Pt−1
+
(
1−Rfft
) M ext
Pt−1
+
(
Rfft (1− ρ)−RDt + ρ
) Dt
Pt−1
]
−C
(
Bt+1
Pt
,
M ext+1
Pt
,Wt
)
. (4.8)
Given this, the bank’s first-order conditions for M ext+1/Pt, Bt+1/Pt, and Dt+1/Pt are:
βEt
{
1−Rfft+1
1 + pit+1
u˜′
(
Φ¯t+1
)}
= u˜′
(
Φ¯t
)
CM
(
Bt+1
Pt
,
M ext+1
Pt
,Wt
)
, (4.9)
βEt
{
RBt+1 −Rfft+1
1 + pit+1
u˜′
(
Φ¯t+1
)}
= u˜′
(
Φ¯t
)
CB
(
Bt+1
Pt
,
M ext+1
Pt
,Wt
)
, (4.10)
Rfft+1(1− ρ) = RDt+1 − ρ, (4.11)
where CM (·) denotes the first partial derivative of C (·) with respect to M ex/P and CB (·)
denotes the first partial derivative of C (·) with respect to B/P .
Equation (4.9) is the banker’s first-order condition for holding excess reserves. On the left
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side is the expected marginal cost to the banker in period t + 1 of holding excess reserves
discounted back to period t. Each unit of excess reserves earns the bank a gross nominal
return of 1, so (1−Rfft+1) is the net nominal return on each additional reserve. The right-hand
side reflects the marginal benefit in period t of carrying excess reserves into t + 1. Holding
excess reserves reduces the cost of producing a given quantity of loans so CM (·) < 0 for all
M ex/P < 0.
Equation (4.10) equates the banker’s discounted expected net marginal benefit in t + 1
from lending in period t with the marginal cost in period t of originating loans. The loan
production function (4.4) implies that the bank faces a rising marginal cost of loan production
so that CB(·) > 0 for all B/P < 0. Equation (4.11) requires that the return on interbank
loans be proportional to the deposit rate.
Together, equations (4.9) and (4.10) prescribe the optimal allocation of the bank’s non-
required reserve assets between excess reserves and loans. First, the bank uses excess reserves
to reduce the cost of originating loans. This gives rise to the terms on the right-hand sides of
equations (4.9) and (4.10). Second, The risk averse banker uses excess reserves as a tool for
managing risk because excess reserves bear constant and zero nominal interest. By increasing
the share of excess reserves in its portfolio, the bank reduces the expected return, but also
the variance, of its overall asset portfolio. If at any point in time, a sufficiently negative
return on loans were possible or if a negative return on loans were sufficiently probable, then
equations (4.9) and (4.10) imply that holding excess reserves would be consistent with risk-
averse behavior.
To see how risk-aversion influences the bank’s decision to hold excess reserves, consider
a simple partial-equilibrium example involving an exogenous increase in the variance of the
return to lending. Suppose that the return to lending RBt+1 has conditional mean EtR
B
t+1 = µR,t
and variance V artR
B
t+1 = σ
2
R,t. Next, let µΦ,t = EtΦ¯t+1 denote the conditional expectation
of period t + 1 bank profits and let σ2Φ,t = V artΦ¯t+1 denote the conditional variance of the
bank’s profits. Then, assuming constant and zero inflation, from the definition of the bank’s
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profit function, the conditional mean and variance of the bank’s profits are:
µΦ,t =
(
µR,t −Rfft+1
) Bt+1
Pt
+
(
1−Rfft+1
)M ext+1
Pt
− EtCM
(
Bt+2
Pt+1
,
M ext+2
Pt+1
,Wt
)
, (4.12)
and
σ2Φ,t =
(
Bt+1
Pt
)2
σ2R,t. (4.13)
The bank’s expected profit is decreasing in excess reserve holdings. As long as the expected
return to lending µR,t is less than the interbank rate, the bank’s expected profit increases with
lending activity. The variance of the bank’s profit is increasing in the size of its loan portfolio
and proportional to the variance on the return to lending.
Consider the bank’s first-order condition for holding excess reserves represented by equation
(4.9). Maintaining the assumption that inflation is constant at zero, rewrite this equation as:
Et
{
u˜′
(
Φ¯t+1
)}
= β˜−1
(
1−Rfft+1
)−1
u˜′
(
Φ¯t
)
CM
(
Bt+1
Pt
,
M ext+1
Pt
,Wt
)
. (4.14)
The left-hand side of (4.14) can be approximated by:
Etu˜
′ (Φ¯t+1) ≈ u˜′ (µΦ,t) + u˜(3) (µΦ,t)
2
σ2Φ,t, (4.15)
where u˜(3) denotes the third partial derivative of u˜.4 Equation (4.15) shows how the banker’s
expected marginal utility is influenced by the expected value and variance of profit. Because
the banker has concave utility, equation (4.15) indicates that an increase in expected future
profit µΦ,t reduces expected future marginal utility. Consistent with the banker’s risk-averse
preferences, equation (4.15) shows that an increase in profit variance σ2Φ,t raises the banker’s
4To obtain this expression, first form the second-order Taylor series expansion of the bank’s period t + 1
marginal utility u˜′
(
Φ¯t+1
)
around the point Φ¯t+1 = µΦ,t:
u˜′
(
Φ¯t+1
)
= u˜′ (µΦ,t) + u˜
′′ (µΦ,t)
(
Φ¯t+1 − µΦ,t
)
+
u˜(3) (µΦ,t)
2
(
Φ¯t+1 − µΦ,t
)2
+R2
(
Φ¯t+1
)
, (4.16)
where the remainder term R2
(
Φ¯t+1
)
is o
(|Φ¯t+1 − µΦ,t|2). Then take expectations and drop the remainder to
obtain the expression in (4.15).
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expected marginal utility because u˜(3) > 0.5
Next, I want to show that risk influences the bank’s decision to hold excess reserves.
Consider a small increase in the variance of the return to lending σ2R,t. As equation (4.15)
indicates, this raises the banker’s expected marginal utility in period t + 1. The banker can
counter the shock by adjusting the composition of the asset portfolio that it carries into period
t+1, but how the bank adjusts its portfolio depends on the magnitude of the difference between
the expected return to lending and the interbank rate –
(
µR,t −Rfft+1
)
– and the magnitude
of the variance of the return to lending σ2R,t. To see why, compute the marginal effect of an
increase in lending on the left-hand side of (4.15):
∂
∂(Bt+1/Pt)
Etu˜
′ (Φ¯t+1) = u˜′′ (µΦ,t)(µR,t −Rfft+1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(−)
+
 u˜(4) (µR,t)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
(−)
(
µR,t −Rfft+1
) Bt+1
Pt︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+)
+ u˜(3) (µΦ,t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+)
 Bt+1Pt σ2R,t. (4.17)
The first term on the right-hand side is negative because an increase in lending raises the
bank’s expected profit and therefore reduces expected marginal utility. The second term has
an ambiguous sign. If the expected return to lending is sufficiently close to the interbank
rate, then the term in brackets is positive.6 Furthermore, if either the size of the bank’s loan
portfolio or the variance on loan returns is sufficiently large, then increasing the size of the
loan portfolio will increase the banker’s expected marginal utility. In this case, the banker
could counter the increased riskiness of lending by contracting the supply of loans and holding
the only alternative asset: excess reserves.
The banking model is consistent with the hypothesis that risk-aversion is sufficient to induce
5With the assumed utility function, u˜(k)(·) > 0 for odd k and u˜(k)(·) < 0 for even k.
6With the assumed preferences, the term in brackets will be positive when:
µR,t < R
ff
t+1 +
2
ξ0Bt+1/Pt
. (4.18)
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a bank to use excess reserves as a tool for managing risk. To the extent that the disruptions in
the financial system that preceded the Great Recession led banks to perceive more risk in the
lending environment, the model appears to offer a qualitative explanation for the accumulation
of excess reserves in the U.S. banking system. The model also supports the observation that
banks have not typically used excess reserves to manage risk on the asset side of their balance
sheet. Holding excess reserves guarantees the bank constant, but negative, nominal interest.
Even a risk-averse bank will only choose to hold excess reserves to manage risk if the expected
return to lending is sufficiently low and if the variance of the return to lending is sufficiently
high.
The observation that optimal behavior sometimes requires the bank to use excess reserves
to manage risk on its asset portfolio is an important consequence of the model. However, when
I simulate the full lending channel model below, I use a linear approximation to the model’s
equilibrium conditions and this particular mechanism drops out. In future work I plan to either
work with a higher-order approximation of the model’s equilibrium conditions that preserves
the risk-aversion mechanism, or to study the risk-aversion mechanism in a smaller, partial
equilibrium setting so that I can derive an analytical solution to the banker’s optimization
problem.
Equations (4.9) and (4.10) capture an additional important consequence of the banker
being a risk-averse expected utility maximizer. The bank incurs a cost in period t to originate
a loan portfolio that matures in period t+ 1. The banker faces an intertemporal substitution
problem compelling it to smooth the path of its marginal utility. This is particularly important
if the bank receives a negative shock to the return on its loan portfolio that matures in period
t. The banker perceives this as an adverse shock to its period t profits and shifts its portfolio
going into period t + 1 away from loans and into excess reserves. This raises period t profits
by reducing the real cost of lending. This mechanism is preserved in the linear approximation
below.
Now, denote the banker’s marginal utility as: Λbt ≡ u˜′
(
Φ¯t
)
. Conditions (4.10) and (4.11)
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can be combined to yield:
Et
{
RBt+1Λ
b
t+1
1 + pit+1
}
= Et
{
Λbt+1
1 + pit+1
}(
RDt+1 − ρ
1− ρ
)
+ β˜−1Λbt · CB
(
Bt+1
Pt
,
M ext+1
Pt
,Wt
)
. (4.19)
The right-hand side of (4.19) is the expected cost in period t+ 1 of originating a loan portfolio
in period t and the left-hand side is the expected return. In the next section, I use this equation
to form the constraint on the expected return that the bank will require on each loan contract
that it originates.
Together, (4.9), (4.10), and (4.11) reflect the bank’s optimality conditions for lending,
excess reserve-holding, and deposit-taking. It is instructive to examine the implications of
these equations for the non-stochastic steady state. Letting letters without subscripts denote
the steady state values of the respective variables, (4.10), (4.9), and (4.11) imply:
β(RB −Rff ) = CB
(
B
P
,
M ex
P
,W
)
, (4.20)
β(1−Rff ) = CM
(
B
P
,
M ex
P
,W
)
, (4.21)
Rff (1− ρ) = RD − ρ. (4.22)
Holding more excess reserves reduces the real cost of producing a given amount of loans. From
equation (4.21), the steady state return on interbank loans is linked to the steady state marginal
reduction in lending costs that excess reserves provide. Without this, the bank would only
hold excess reserves in the steady state if Rff = 1. But in practice, banks hold a small amount
of excess reserves on average and the average gross interbank rate exceeds one. Therefore, I
require that:
CM < 0, (4.23)
in the steady state since I am particularly interested in studying how excess reserve holdings
fluctuate endogenously with the business cycle.
40
4.2 The demand for capital
The loan contracting environment that I study is different from the environment in Bernanke et
al. in two important ways. First, I assume that a loan contract specifies the nominal repayment
rate in advance and constant with respect to ex post realizations of the aggregate state. This
forces the bank to bear aggregate risk associated with unpredictable fluctuations in inflation
and the aggregate return on capital. Second, I model stochastic volatility in the distribution
of capital returns across borrowers. This is a tool for introducing an exogenous shock to the
share of loans in the bank’s portfolio that default and allows me to examine how a shock to
the return on assets in the banking system is transmitted to the aggregate economy.
At the end of period t, an entrepreneur j has accumulated real net worth N jt+1 that it uses
to purchase capital Kjt+1 at a real price of Qt. Both N
j
t+1 and Qt are measured in terms of the
final output good. Capital purchases in excess of net worth are financed by a nominal bank
loan Bjt+1:
Bjt+1 = Pt
(
QtK
j
t+1 −N jt+1
)
. (4.24)
The ex post gross return to the entrepreneur’s capital is ωjt+1R
K
t+1, where R
K
t+1 is the aggregate
return to capital and ωjt+1 is an idiosyncratic disturbance that scales the jth entrepreneur’s
capital return relative to the aggregate return. I describe how RKt+1 is determined in the next
section. ωjt+1 is i.i.d. across entrepreneurs with a log-normal distribution:
ωjt+1 ∼ log-N
(
−σ
2
ω,t+1
2
, σ2ω,t+1
)
, (4.25)
where σ2ω,t+1 is a stationary, strictly positive stochastic process with mean σ
2
ω. Under this
specification, Et(ω
j
t+1|σ2ω,t+1) = 1.7 I find it useful to anchor the conditional mean of ωjt+1 at 1
so that – as in Bernanke et al. – the conditional distribution of idiosyncratic returns to capital
7A random variable X that follows a log-normal distribution with parameters τ and σ2 has mean E(X) =
exp(τ + σ2/2) and variance V (X) =
[
exp(σ2)− 1] · exp(2τ + σ2). It follows that if τ = −σ2/2, then E(X) = 1
and V (X) = exp(σ2)− 1.
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is always centered around the mean EtR
K
t+1. See Figure 1 for an illustration of how σ
2
ω,t affects
the shape of the log-normal density function.
The entrepreneur’s demand for capital is determined by that entrepreneur’s net worth and
the terms of its loan contract. A loan contract specifies a non-default nominal gross repayment
rate R¯jt+1 and a nominal loan amount B
j
t+1. Given ex post realizations of inflation and the
aggregate return to capital, a stochastic default threshold can be defined as:
ω¯jt+1 ≡
R¯jt+1
(
QtK
j
t+1 −N jt+1
)
(1 + pit+1)RKt+1QtK
j
t+1
, (4.26)
such that if ωjt+1 > ω¯
j
t+1, then the real return on the entrepreneur’s capital project is sufficient
for the entrepreneur to be able to repay its loan.
The variance of the idiosyncratic disturbance is realized after the loan contract is made.
When I simulate the model, I suppose its square root evolves according to:
log (σω,t+1/σω) = ρσ log (σω,t/σω) + ε
σ
t+1, (4.27)
where εσt+1 is zero-mean i.i.d process. Note that while the conditional expected value of ω
j
t+1
is constant at 1, the median of ωjt+1 is exp(−σ2ω,t+1/2). By reducing the median of ωjt+1, a
positive realization of εσt+1 increases the probability that ω
j
t+1 will be realized less than the
threshold ω¯jt+1 and so increases the likelihood that any entrepreneur j will default in period
t + 1. Accordingly, a positive shock to σ2ω,t+1 causes an exogenous rise in the proportion of
entrepreneurs that default on their loans. For this reason, I interpret the innovation εσt+1 as
an unanticipated shock to the return on lending or as a positive shock to loan defaults.89 By
8Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2003) also incorporate stochastic volatility in the distribution of the
idiosyncratic shock to entrepreneurial returns. However, they assume that the volatility shock is realized before
loan contracts are written and so the financial shock is not a source of unanticipated defaults.
9In the present model, the bank and entrepreneurs observe ex post realizations of the aggregate state with
certainty so a positive shock to σ2ω,t+1 only causes unanticipated defaults for a single period. In practice, banks
do not necessarily observe what has caused a sudden shift in the proportion of their loans that default. As I
continue to develop this work, I plan to restrict the bank from directly observing ex post realizations of σ2ω,t+1
or RKt+1 directly. Instead, it will receive a noisy signal that combines information about the two variables. The
bank will then have to solve a simple signal extraction to uncover what component of the underlying state is
driving the fluctuation in loan defaults. Presumably this modification will cause the aggregate effects of shocks
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increasing the proportion of entrepreneurs that default on their loans, a positive innovation to
σ2ω,t+1 reduces the return on the bank’s loan portfolio R
B
t+1.
A borrower in default surrenders the realized value of its investment project to the bank, but
the bank incurs an auditing cost when it takes over the project. This cost is a fixed proportion µ
of the realized value of the project in t+1. Therefore, the bank receives (1−µ)ωjt+1RKt+1QtKjt+1
from a project in default. The parameter µ reflects a deadweight loss associated with debt
default and is an important source of financial friction in the model. In the special case where
µ = 0, the bank incurs no auditing cost and recovers the full realized value of all projects in
default.
Now, for a given ex post realization of the aggregate state, the bank expects to receive in
period t+ 1 from an entrepreneur j:
{[
1− F (ω¯jt+1|σ2ω,t+1)
]
ω¯jt+1 + (1− µ)
∫ ω¯jt+1
0
ωdF (ω|σ2ω,t+1)
}
RKt+1QtK
j
t+1. (4.28)
Next, I define:
Γ(ω¯jt+1|σ2ω,t+1) ≡
[
1− F (ω¯jt+1|σ2ω,t+1)
]
ω¯jt+1 +
∫ ω¯jt+1
0
ωdF (ω|σ2ω,t+1), (4.29)
and:
µG(ω¯jt+1|σ2ω,t+1) ≡ µ
∫ ω¯jt+1
0
ωdF (ω|σ2ω,t+1). (4.30)
Note that Γ(·|·) is the expected share of the entrepreneur’s capital project going to the bank
and G(·|·) is the expected cost of monitoring one unit of the entrepreneur’s capital project.
Observe that by using these definitions, expression (4.28) can now be written concisely as:
[
Γ(ω¯jt+1|σ2ω,t+1)− µG(ω¯jt+1|σ2ω,t+1)
]
RKt+1QtK
j
t+1. (4.31)
Now, I use (4.31) to define RB,jt+1 as the expected nominal return from lending to entrepreneur
to σ2ω,t+1 more persistent as the bank gradually uncovers the true state of the economy.
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j conditional on aggregate realizations of RKt+1, pit+1, and σ
2
ω,t+1:
RB,jt+1
1 + pit+1
=
[
Γ(ω¯jt+1|σ2ω,t+1)− µG(ω¯jt+1|σ2ω,t+1)
]
RKt+1
QtK
j
t+1
QtK
j
t+1 −N jt+1
. (4.32)
The optimal contract with entrepreneur j must satisfy:
Et
{
Λbt+1
RB,jt+1
1 + pit+1
}
= Ξt, (4.33)
where Ξt is the cost of lending determined by the right-hand side of (4.19):
Ξt ≡ Et
{
Λbt+1
1 + pit+1
}(
RDt+1 − ρ
1− ρ
)
+ β−1Λbt · CB
(
Bt+1
Pt
,
M ext+1
Pt
,Wt
)
. (4.34)
Notice that the bank treats Ξt as a constant in the contracting problem. Equation (4.33) is
important because it shows how the banker’s marginal utility is used to price risk in the loan
contract. By combining (4.32) and (4.33), I obtain the appropriate constraint on the bank’s
return in the optimal loan contract:
Et
{
Λbt+1
[
Γ(ω¯jt+1|σ2ω,t+1)− µG(ω¯jt+1|σ2ω,t+1)
]
Rkt+1
}
QtK
j
t+1 = Ξt(QtK
j
t+1 −N jt+1), (4.35)
where the expectation is over RKt+1, pit+1, and ω¯
j
t+1 given the information available at time t.
In the spirit of the loan contract studied by Gale and Hellwig (1985), a loan contract
in the lending channel model is characterized by a quadruple (Bjt+1,K
j
t+1, ω¯
j
t+1, R¯
j
t+1) that
specifies a nominal loan principle, a quantity of capital to be purchased with the borrowed
funds, a state-contingent threshold for the idiosyncratic shock that specifies when the bank
audits the borrower, and a gross nominal repayment rate that the entrepreneur repays when
the it does not default. Note that unlike in Bernanke et al., the repayment rate R¯jt+1 is
independent of the realized state in period t + 1. The optimal contract is the set of values
for (Bjt+1,K
j
t+1, ω¯
j
t+1, R¯
j
t+1) that maximizes the expected return to the entrepreneur subject
to the constraints that equations (4.24) and (4.26) hold and that the bank earns an expected
return given by equation (4.33).
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While a loan contract is an optimal setting of the quadruple (Bjt+1,K
j
t+1, ω¯
j , R¯jt+1), I can
simplify the problem by using (4.24) and (4.26) to substitute two of the four control variables
out of the optimization problem. Equation (4.24) defines the one-to-one correspondence be-
tween the face-value of a loan Bjt+1 to entrepreneur j and the quantity of capital K
j
t+1 that the
entrepreneur will purchase, so I can use the equation to eliminate Bjt+1 from the optimization
problem. Next, I can use equation (4.26) to eliminate the threshold ω¯jt+1 from the problem. In
doing this, I can specify the contracting problem more concisely as an optimization over two
variables – Kjt+1 and ω¯
j
t+1 – instead of four.
Given the discussion in the preceding paragraph, the solution to the contracting problem
is found by solving:
max
Kjt+1,R¯
j
t+1
Et
{[
1− Γ(ω¯jt+1|σ2ω,t+1)
]
RKt+1
}
QtK
j
t+1, (4.36)
subject to (4.26) and (4.35). Let λCt+1 be the multiplier on (4.35). The solution to (4.36)
implies that each entrepreneur receives the same loan rate R¯t+1 and a loan amount such that
QtK
j
t+1/N
j
t+1 is identical across all entrepreneurs. So I can drop the entrepreneur-specific
index j and write the first order conditions for (4.36) with respect to Kt+1 and R¯t+1 as:
Et
{[
1− Γ(ω¯t+1|σ2ω,t+1)
]
RKt+1
}
− Et
{
Γω(ω¯t+1|σ2ω,t+1)
1 + pit+1
}
R¯t+1
Nt+1
QtKt+1
+λCt Et
{
Λbt+1
[
Γω(ω¯t+1|σ2ω,t+1)− µGω(ω¯t+1|σ2ω,t+1)
] 1
1 + pit+1
}
R¯t+1
Nt+1
QtKt+1
+λCt Et
{
Λbt+1
[
Γ(ω¯t+1|σ2ω,t+1)− µG(ω¯t+1|σ2ω,t+1)
]
RKt+1
}
= λCt Ξt, (4.37)
and:
Et
{
Γω(ω¯t+1|σ2ω,t+1)
1
1 + pit+1
}
= λCt Et
{
Λbt+1
[
Γω(ω¯t+1|σ2ω,t+1)
− µGω(ω¯t+1|σ2ω,t+1)
] 1
1 + pit+1
}
. (4.38)
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As suggested by condition (4.37), the quantity Kt+1 in the loan contract has direct and in-
direct effects on the returns to the entrepreneur and lender. The first term on the left-hand
side reflects the direct expected marginal benefit to the entrepreneur from being allocated an
additional unit of capital while the fourth term captures the direct marginal benefit going to
the bank.
Allocating more capital to the entrepreneur increases the threshold ω¯t+1 by:
∂ω¯t+1
∂Kt+1
=
R¯t+1
RKt+1(1 + pit+1)Kt+1
Nt+1
QtKt+1
. (4.39)
The proportion of borrowers that default is increasing in ω¯t+1 and so the second and third
terms on the left-hand side of (4.37) reflect the indirect marginal cost to the entrepreneur and
bank that arises from an increase in Kt+1.
Next, (4.38) reflects how R¯t+1 affects the returns of the entrepreneur and bank. The
threshold ω¯t+1 is also increasing in R¯t+1 and the left-hand side reflects the marginal effect
of this on the entrepreneur’s return. The right-hand side reflects the marginal effect of the
additional loan defaults on the bank’s return.
Equations (4.26), (4.35), (4.37), and (4.38) characterize the entrepreneur’s demand for
capital given the terms of the optimal loan contract. Since each entrepreneur will have the same
ratio of capital to net worth, Equation (4.32) can be aggregated to produce an expression for
the ex post nominal return on the bank’s loan portfolio RBt+1. Equation (4.34) is a restatement
of bank’s first-order condition for holding loans.
4.3 The entrepreneurial sector and net worth
In this section I describe the behavior of the entrepreneurial sector. Most of this section
mirrors the exposition in Bernanke, et al. The entrepreneurial sector enters period t with
capital Kt. At the beginning of the period, entrepreneurs hire labor from a competitive labor
market to combine with capital to produce the wholesale good Yt. The aggregate output of
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the entrepreneurial sector is:
Yt = ZtK
α
t L
1−α
t , (4.40)
where Zt is an exogenous aggregate technology process.
10 Note that Zt is a distinct process
from the idiosyncratic disturbance to each entrepreneur’s return to capital.
After production, the entrepreneurial sector sells its wholesale output to the retail sector
at a real price of 1/Xt per unit, where Xt is the gross markup of the price of retail goods over
the price of wholesale goods. I describe the determination of Xt in Section 4.6 below. During
the production process, a fraction δ of the capital stock depreciates. The remaining capital is
sold to the capital-producing sector – discussed in the next section – at a price of Qt units of
final output per unit of capital. I describe how Qt is determined in Section 4.5. The aggregate
return to capital – after depreciation – is:
RKt =
1
Xt
αYt
Kt
+Qt(1− δ)
Qt−1
, (4.41)
where:
1
Xt
αYt
Kt
, (4.42)
is the marginal product of capital from wholesale good production in terms of the final output
good. Expression (4.42) is the relevant measure of the marginal product of capital for en-
trepreneurs because αYt/Kt is the marginal product of capital in terms of the wholesale good.
Entrepreneurs sell their output to the retail sector at a price of 1/Xt units of the final output
good per unit of the wholesale good.
To see why the right-hand side of equation (4.41) is the gross return to capital, note that
the numerator is the marginal real income earned in period t by entrepreneurs holding a unit
10The production function for an entrepreneur is Y jt = Zt
(
Kjt
)α (
Ljt
)1−α
, where Ljt and Y
j
t are the labor
input and output of the jth entrepreneur. Entrepreneurs pay the same wages to labor and so each chooses
the same capital-to-labor ratio. Write the entrepreneur’s production function as: Y jt = Zt (Kt/Lt)
α Ljt , and
integrate this expression over j to obtain (4.40).
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of capital purchased in period t− 1. The denominator of (4.41) is the original purchase price
of capital. Therefore the ratio on the right-hand side of equation (4.41) is in fact the gross
return on the capital stock from period t− 1 to period t.
Together equations (4.40) and (4.41) show how exogenous fluctuations in aggregate pro-
ductivity Zt drive fluctuations in the aggregate return to capital R
K
t . This can be seen clearly
by using the definition of the production function to eliminate Yt from equation (4.41):
RKt =
αZt
Xt
(
Lt
Kt
)1−α
+Qt(1− δ)
Qt−1
. (4.43)
Other things equal, the return to capital RKt is an increasing function of aggregate productivity
Zt.
In the production function (4.40), Lt is a composite of household laborHt and entrepreneurial
labor Het :
Lt = H
Ω
t (H
e
t )
1−Ω . (4.44)
The labor inputs are each paid their marginal products. The real household wage Wt must
satisfy:
(1− α)Ω Yt
HtXt
= Wt, (4.45)
while the entrepreneurial wage W et satisfies:
(1− α)(1− Ω) Yt
HetXt
= W et . (4.46)
Next, it is essential that entrepreneurs be prevented from accumulating sufficient wealth
to become self-financing. To ensure this, I take the same approach as Bernanke et al. Each
period, after all business between entrepreneurs and the bank has been settled, an exogenous
fraction 1−γ of randomly selected entrepreneurs close their firms, consume their accumulated
wealth, and exit the model. Each departing entrepreneur is replaced by a new entrepreneur
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with no accumulated wealth.
Let Vt denote the equity accumulated by entrepreneurs immediately after concluding their
relationship with the intermediary at the beginning of period t. From (4.29), Vt can be ex-
pressed as:
Vt =
[
1− Γ (ω¯t|σ2ω,t)]RKt Qt−1Kt, (4.47)
where Γ(·|·) is the share entrepreneurial capital income that is transferred to the bank. Then,
at the end of period t, the accumulated net worth of the entrepreneurial sector is:
Nt+1 = γVt +W
e
t , (4.48)
where W et is the wage income under the assumption that each entrepreneur inelastically sup-
plies a single unit of labor for production. Now it is straightforward to characterize the
evolution of entrepreneurial net worth by combining equations (4.46), (4.47), and (4.48):
Nt+1 = γ
[
1− Γ(ω¯t|σ2ω,t)
]
RKt Qt−1Kt + (1− α)(1− Ω)ZtKαt H(1−α)Ωt /Xt. (4.49)
Recall that Γ(·|·) is the share of entrepreneurial income going to the bank so 1−Γ(·|·) is simply
the share that the entrepreneurs are able to keep. By making use of the definition of Γ(·|·),
it is apparent that equation (4.49) has the same form as (3.25). Like Bernanke et al., I find
a value of γ that is greater than 0.9 in my calibration. Since ω¯t is a function of Nt, (4.49)
indicates that fluctuations in net worth are highly persistent.
Finally, entrepreneurial consumption Cet is given as:
Cet = (1− γ)Vt. (4.50)
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4.4 The household
Each period, the household consumes, supplies labor, and supplies deposits to the bank. The
household’s preferences are represented by:
Et
∞∑
s=0
βs
{
C1−σct+s
1− σc + ζh
(1−Ht+s)1−η
1− η + ζd
(Dt+1+s/Pt+s)
1−σd
1− σd
}
, (4.51)
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the subjective discount factor and σc, σd, η, ζh, and ζd are positive con-
stants. Ct and Ht represent household consumption and labor. Like Canzoneri, Cumby, Diba,
and Lo´pez-Salido (2008), I incorporate real bank deposits Dt+1/Pt directly into the utility
function. This assumption reflects the transaction services that deposits provide in practice
and is analogous to the common assumption that money is an argument in the household
utility function.
The household’s period budget constraint is essentially the same as the one presented in
Bernanke et al.:
Ct +
Dt+1
Pt
= WtHt − Tt + Πt + R
D
t Dt
(1 + pit)Pt−1
. (4.52)
Here, Πt denotes profits received from owning retail firms and the bank and Tt is a lump-sum
tax. The household’s first-order conditions are:
ζh(1−Ht)−η = C−σCt Wt, (4.53)(
Dt+1
Pt
)
=
[
ζ−1d C
−σc
t
(
Rnt+1 −RDt+1
Rnt+1
)]− 1
σd
, (4.54)
where:
1
Rnt+1
= βEt
{
C−σct+1
C−σct
1
1 + pit+1
}
. (4.55)
Equation (4.54) is a deposit supply expression. It is analogous to a conventional money demand
equation derived within a money-in-the-utility function model. This is a potentially important
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component of the bank lending channel. Since deposits provide the household with transaction
services, the bank can borrow from the household at a rate below the risk-free nominal rate.
This concludes the exposition of the novel components of the model environment. The
remainder of the economic structure is essentially the same as that described in Bernanke, et
al.
4.5 Capital production
Capital is produced during the period by a competitive capital-producing firm. Immedi-
ately following production in period t, the firm buys the entire capital stock Kt from the
entrepreneurs and combines it with some of the final output good It to produce new capital
Kt+1 that is sold back to the entrepreneurs. Capital accumulates subject to a convex ad-
justment cost. Adjustment costs induce variability in the price of capital and entrepreneurial
net worth. Assuming that entrepreneurs repurchase the entire capital stock each period allows
capital adjustment costs to be considered separately from the entrepreneur’s financial problem.
The capital-producer solves:
max
Kt,It
QtKt+1 − It − Q¯t(1− δ)Kt, (4.56)
subject to:
Kt+1 = Φ
(
It
Kt
)
Kt + (1− δ)Kt, (4.57)
where Q¯t is the price of capital in period t after production, but before new capital has been
produced. As equation (4.57) suggests, investment It in period t results in only Φ(It/Kt)Kt
units of period t + 1 capital. Φ(·) is increasing and concave with Φ(0) = 0. The first-order
conditions for It and Kt are:
Qt = Φ
′
(
It
Kt
)
, (4.58)
Q¯t(1− δ) = QtΦ
(
It
Kt
)
+Qt(1− δ)− It
Kt
. (4.59)
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Bernanke et al. assume that Q = 1 in the steady state. Since Q = 1 in the steady state,
the difference between Qt and Q¯t is of second-order consequence and so I follow Bernanke et
al. and set Q¯t = Qt.
Bernanke et al. do not explicitly discuss the functional form of the adjustment cost function
Φ(·), but for completeness, I assume the following:
Φ
(
It
Kt
)
≡ 1
1− ϕ
(
It
Kt
)1−ϕ(K
I
)ϕ
+
[
1− (1− ϕ)−1
]( I
K
)
, (4.60)
where K¯ and I¯ are the steady-state values of capital and investment and ϕ > 0 is a constant.
In the steady state:
Φ
(
I
K
)
=
I
K
, (4.61)
revealing that the functional form specified in (4.60) implies no capital adjustment costs in the
steady state. It is straightforward to show that with the assumed form of Φ(·), the elasticity
of the steady state capital price Q with respect to the steady state investment to capital ratio
is ϕ.11
4.6 Retail goods, final output, and price setting
The retail sector comprises a continuum of firms that purchase wholesale goods from the en-
trepreneurial sector and produce retail goods by differentiating the wholesale output without
cost. Retailers are monopolistically competitive and set the prices of their products according
to the familiar Calvo (1983) mechanism. Bernanke et al. introduce retailers into the supply
chain specifically to separate the price setting decision from the entrepreneurs’ financial prob-
lem. The final good producer purchases the retail goods and produces the final output good
using a CES aggregation technology.
11That is:
∂Q
∂(I/K)
(I/K)
Q
= ϕ. (4.62)
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The final output good Y ft is a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate of retail goods:
Y ft =
(∫ 1
0
Yt(i)
(−1)/ di
)/(−1)
, (4.63)
where Yt(i) is the retail output from retailer i in terms of the wholesale good Yt and  > 1 is the
elasticity of substitution among the retail goods. The demand for each retail good is obtained
by solving for the minimum cost combination of retail goods to produce a given quantity of
the final good:
Yt(i) =
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)−
Y ft , (4.64)
where Pt(i) is the price of good i and:
Pt =
(∫ 1
0
Pt(i)
(1−) di
)1/(1−)
, (4.65)
is the nominal price index of the final good.
Retailers set their prices optimally subject to the familiar Calvo (1983) price-setting mech-
anism. In period t a fraction 1− χ of retailers are allowed to set the price of their good after
observing the realization of period t shocks and taking the price of wholesale goods Pwt as
given. Recall that 1/Xt is the real price of a wholesale good so:
Pwt ≡
Pt
Xt
. (4.66)
All retailers optimizing in period t choose P ∗t to solve:
∞∑
k=0
χkEt
{
∆realt,t+k
P ∗t − Pwt+k
Pt+k
Y ∗t+k(i)
}
, (4.67)
where ∆realt,t+k ≡ βkCt/Ct+k is the relevant discount factor and Y ∗t+k(i) is the quantity of retail
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good i demanded in period t+ k.12 The first-order condition for optimizing (4.67) is:
∞∑
k=0
χkEt
{
∆realt,t+k
(
P ∗
Pt+k
)−
Y ∗t+k(i)
[
P ∗t
Pt+k
−
(

− 1
)
Pwt+k
Pt+k
]}
= 0. (4.68)
Finally, from (4.65) it follows that under the assumed pricing mechanism, the law of motion
for the price level is:
Pt =
[
χP 1−t−1 + (1− χ) (P ∗t )1−
]1/(1−)
. (4.69)
Equations (4.68) and (4.69) can be log-linearized around a zero-inflation steady state to obtain
a forward-looking new-Keynesian Phillips curve.
4.7 Government
The government comprises a fiscal authority and a central bank. The fiscal authority finances
an exogenous stream of purchases Gt by collecting real lump-sum taxes Tt from the household
and by accepting real revenues RCBt from the central bank. The flow budget constraint for
the fiscal authority is:
Gt = Tt +RCBt. (4.70)
Fiscal policy is passive in the sense that the fiscal authority takes government consumption
and revenues received from the central bank as given and then adjusts tax collections to ensure
that the budget constraint holds. The fiscal authority neither owns assets nor issues liabilities
so its balance sheet is the trivial balance sheet with no entries.
I assume that the central bank directly controls the supply of bank reserves without specif-
ically modeling the reserve supply process. In practice, a central bank might do this by
conducting sales or purchases in the market for government debt. But in the present model
12Bernanke et al. actually assume that the expectation in (4.67) is given information at t− 1 so that, in their
model, inflation between t and t+ 1 is predetermined with respect to period t.
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– as in the Bernanke et al. model – the fiscal authority does not issue debt, so open market
operations are not available to the central bank. In my future work, it will be worthwhile to
model the reserve supply process more explicitly in order to study the different ways that the
central bank can use its balance sheet as a policy tool.
In period t, the central bank creates new nominal bank reserves Mt+1 and transfers the
revenue generated by the change in the supply of reserves to the fiscal authority. The central
bank’s budget constraint shows how the central bank earns revenue through reserve creation:
RCBt =
Mt+1 −Mt
Pt
. (4.71)
Note that the central bank has a simple balance sheet: at the end of period t, the central bank
holds no assets and it’s nominal net worth is equal to the negative of it’s outstanding reserve
liabilities Mt+1/Pt.
Now, I can combine the budget constraints for the fiscal authority and the central bank to
obtain the consolidated government budget constraint:
Gt =
Mt+1 −Mt
Pt
+ Tt. (4.72)
This constraint shows how the fiscal authority adjusts lump-sum taxes levied on the household
each period in response to exogenous changes in government consumption and changes in the
supply of real bank reserves. Equation (4.72) is identical to the government budget constraint
specified in Bernanke et al. with the exception that the monetary base is the central bank
liability in Bernanke et al. instead of the supply of reserves.
In the dynamic analysis below, I suppose that the central bank sets the supply of reserves
each period in order to implement either a rule for the nominal interest rate or a rule for the
growth rate of nominal reserves. When the central bank follows an interest rate rule, it adjusts
the supply of reserves in order to implement the following feedback rule:
rˆnt+1 = ρrrˆ
n
t + ςpipˆit + (ςy/4) yˆt + v
r
t , (4.73)
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where vrt is an exogenous monetary policy shock process and rˆ
n
t , yˆt, and pˆit reflect the log-
deviations of Rnt , Yt, and 1 + pit from their steady state values. The central bank is able to
implement this rule because its control over the supply of reserves gives it control over supply
of bank deposits and ultimately, through the household’s demand for deposits, the nominal
interest rate.
I also study a case in which the central bank follows a rule specifying stochastic growth of
the nominal supply of bank reserves around a trend:
Mt+1 =
(
1 + γMt
)
Mt, (4.74)
where γMt is an exogenous money growth process with mean zero so that the rule is consistent
with a zero inflation steady state. In linear terms, the policy rule can be expressed as:
mˆnbrt+1 = mˆ
nbr
t − pˆit + vmt , (4.75)
where mˆnbrt+1 is the log-deviation of Mt+1/Pt from the steady state and v
m
t ≡ log
(
1 + γMt
)
is
an exogenous shock to the growth rate of nominal reserves.
4.8 Market clearing
The aggregate resource constraint is the same as that from Bernanke et al.:
Y ft = Ct + C
e
t + It +Gt + µR
K
t Qt−1KtG(ω¯t|σ2ω,t). (4.76)
Also, the output from the wholesale good sector must equal the output from the final good
sector:
Y ft = Yt. (4.77)
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Finally, clearing in the interbank market implies:
Bfft+1 = 0. (4.78)
The last expression follows because the net positions of banks on the interbank market must
exactly offset each other.
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Chapter 5
Equilibrium Dynamics in the Lending
Channel Model
Now I examine the dynamic properties of the lending channel model. First, I log-linearize the
model around a deterministic, zero-inflation steady state. I report the linearized equilibrium
conditions in Appendix A. Next, I calibrate the model parameters and simulate the dynamic
responses of model variables to several exogenous shocks. I compare the proposed bank lending
channel model to a variant of the Bernanke et al. model and a baseline model without financial
friction.
5.1 Calibration
I partition the parameters of the lending channel model into two sets. The first set of param-
eters have close analogues in other commonly studied business cycle models. I refer to the
business cycle literature for guidance on how to appropriately select the values for these pa-
rameters. I draw most heavily from the calibration used by Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2007).
I also use some of the parameter estimates obtained by Christiano and Eichenbaum (2005)
and Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2009). The second set of parameters in the partition
arise as elements of the less common or novel components of the lending channel model struc-
ture. I discuss my strategy for calibrating these parameters below and I report the calibrated
parameter values in Tables 1 and 2.
I set the household’s subjective discount factor β to 0.9902 to imply a steady state annual
real interest rate of 4 percent Kydland and Prescott (1982). In the U.S., wages represent about
70 percent of total production costs and I impose this in the steady state by setting the Cobb-
Douglas production function parameter α to 0.30 Prescott (1986). I maintain the conventional
assumption of a 10 percent annual capital depreciation rate and set the quarterly depreciation
rate δ to 0.026 Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2007). I set the elasticity of substitution between
retail goods  so that the gross markup of retail goods over wholesale goods is 1.25 Altig,
Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Linde (2005). Like Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2007), I set the
Calvo-pricing parameter χ to 0.8 so that the nominal price of the average retail good remains
fixed for 5 quarters. And I choose steady state government consumption G so that the ratio
of government spending to output is 0.17 in the steady state. I follow Bernanke, Gertler, and
Gilchrist (1999) and set ϕ – the elasticity of the steady state price of capital Q with respect to
the steady state investment to capital ratio – to 0.25. I also follow Bernanke et al. by setting Ω
equal to 0.01× (1−α)−1 so that the entrepreneurial wage is 1 percent of output in the steady
state. I normalize the mean of the aggregate productivity process Z to 1.
I follow Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2007) by setting the curvature parameter on consump-
tion in the household’s utility function σc to 2. This implies a steady-state intertemporal
elasticity of substitution of 0.5. I follow Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2009) and set the
curvature parameter on leisure in the household’s utility function η to 1. Next, I choose ζh
to be 0.2041 so that the household allocates 20 percent of its time to the labor market in the
steady state Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2007). Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2009) esti-
mate the curvature parameter on real deposits in a household utility function to be 10.62. I
use this value for σd. Then, given the rest of the calibration, I set the weight on real deposits
in the household’s utility function ζd to 0.0494 to ensure that households are willing to supply
just the right quantity of deposits to fund the bank’s steady state asset portfolio.
Next, I use a restriction on the steady state ratio of investment-to-output I/Y to pin down
the steady state return to capital. I make use of the following steady state relationships:
RK =
α
X
Y
K
+ 1− δ, (5.1)
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and
I = δK. (5.2)
Together, these imply that:
RK =
αδ
X
Y
I
+ 1− δ. (5.3)
With assumed values for α and δ and observing that the markup satisfies X = /( − 1), I
compute RK given I/Y . I use data from the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA)
tables to compute the average ratio of investment to output in the U.S from 1947:Q1 - 2010:Q4.1
I find a value of 0.1281 for I/Y , which implies a long run capital-to-output ratio of 4.9273. I
obtain an annual gross return to capital of 1.0940 in the steady state.2
Next, I set values for parameters of the model that are associated with the lending envi-
ronment. Like Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999), I impose a steady state capital-to-net
worth ratio of 2 and require an annual entrepreneurial default rate of 30 percent. I accomplish
the latter restriction by setting F (ω¯|σ2ω) = 0.3/4. Next, the gross non-default borrowing rate
R¯ is the borrowing rate paid in the steady state by entrepreneurs who do not default. In
practice, there is not a single borrowing rate for all borrowers, but for calibration purposes, I
associate R¯ with the prime lending rate. The average annual U.S. prime lending rate between
July 1954 and February 2011 has been 1.0735 annually. Therefore, I require that in the steady
state, the non-default lending rate R¯ equals 1.07350.25. Notice that while the average lending
rate exceeds the return to capital, equilibrium default means that entrepreneurs pay a lower
1Available at: http://www.bea.gov/national/nipaweb
2A 9 percent average annual return to the capital stock might appear too low for the United States. I
emphasize that this value is computed using an adjusted marginal product of capital that accounts for the steady
state price markup X of final retail goods over intermediate wholesale goods. A more standard calculation might
express the steady state return to capital as
RK = αY/K + 1− δ. (5.4)
Using this formulation and the assumed values of α, δ, and I/Y , I obtain an annual return of 14.7 percent. But
this overstates the return to capital from the perspective of entrepreneurs and the banker. These agents are
ultimately concerned with purchasing the final retail good at the monopolistically competitive price.
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rate than R¯ on average.
My calibration of the contracting parameters implies a steady state default threshold for
the idiosyncratic shock ω¯ of 0.4976 and a value for the default cost parameter µ of 0.1514.
Both of these values are on the order of what Bernanke et al. obtain and the calibrated value
of µ is well below the estimate of 0.33 found by Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2009). The
calibration restrictions also imply a gross (annual) ex post return on the bank’s loan portfolio
of 1.0431. Importantly, this number is less than the calibrated value for R¯ indicating that the
bank confronts loan default in the steady state. I obtain a value for σ2ω of 0.0738 implying a
steady state variance of the idiosyncratic shock ω of 0.0766. And finally, I find a value of 0.9695
for γ implying that each period, just over 3 percent of entrepreneurs close their operation and
consume their accumulated net worth.
From the banker’s first-order conditions, the steady state deposit rate is determined by the
steady state interbank lending rate and the required reserve ratio:
RD = Rff (1− ρ) + ρ. (5.5)
I assume that the steady state interbank rate is equal to the nominal risk-free rate and I set
the required reserve ratio to 10 percent of deposits. This implies an annualized deposit rate
of 1.0361. While this may appear as an implausibly high return for transaction deposits, I
interpret the deposit rate in the model as including costs that the bank bears on behalf of the
household in order to facilitate transactions.
The model predicts a high steady state deposit rate because I abstract from the real
costs of managing deposits associated with facilitating transactions, servicing automatic teller
machines, providing human teller services, and so on. While these costs might be small relative
to the costs associated with originating loans and collecting assets from borrowers in default,
they are surely a source of non-trivial downward pressure on deposit rates. Incorporating these
costs into the model would reduce the equilibrium deposit rate in the model by the marginal
cost of managing deposits.
In order for the steady state of the calibrated model to be consistent with the U.S. historical
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average, I require that banks hold excess reserves equal to 0.5 percent of deposits in the steady
state. I follow Canzoneri, Cumby, Diba, and Lo´pez-Salido (2008), and set the exponent on
labor in the loan production function αb at unity so that loan production is linear in labor.
Given these restrictions I obtain a value of 0.0086 for the exponent on excess reserves in the
loan production function γb. I also find that the productivity coefficient in the loan production
function Zb equals 2.6610.
5.2 Simulated impulse responses
With the parameter values from above, I solve the linear model using Klein’s (2000) method.3
Under the assumption that the central bank sets monetary policy using a rule for the nominal
interest rate, I compute impulse responses for each of the model variables to an aggregate
productivity shock, a government consumption shock, a monetary policy shock, and a shock
to the standard deviation of the idiosyncratic shock to entrepreneurial returns. Because this
last shock causes an unanticipated increase in loan defaults, I will simply refer to it as the
loan default shock. I also consider the case where monetary policy is specified as a rule for the
growth rate of the supply of nominal reserves. I compute and report the simulated impulse
responses of model variables following a shock to the growth rate of nominal reserves.
For comparison, I also compute and report impulse responses from two other models. The
first of the comparison models is the Bernanke et al. model and I identify the impulse responses
computed from this model by the abbreviation ‘bgg’ in the figures. The second is a baseline
model – abbreviated ‘base’ in the figures – that I obtain by ‘turning off’ the financial frictions
in Bernanke et al. I do this by setting the loan monitoring cost parameter to µ = 0 to remove
the financial friction in Bernanke et al. The baseline model is representative of the New
Neoclassical Synthesis (NNS) class of models.4 The Bernanke et al. model nests the baseline
3See Appendix B.1 for a full discussion of the solution method.
4Goodfriend and King (1997) define the New Neoclassical Synthesis (NNS) as an approach to modeling
the business cycle that draws from both real-business-cycle (RBC) analysis and New Keynesian (NK) macroe-
conomics. NNS models incorporate imperfect competition and nominal frictions into business cycle models
founded on intertemporal optimization and rational expectations.
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model as a special case. My parameter calibration differs from Bernanke et al. and so the
impulse responses that I generate for the Bernanke et al. and baseline models do not have the
same quantitative magnitudes as what Bernanke et al. report in their paper.
To be clear, it is not appropriate to consider the Bernanke et al. model as a special case of
the lending channel model. The underlying structure of the lending channel model has several
features that make the model distinct from Bernanke et al. First, the lending channel model
embeds a model of loan contracting that forces the bank to bear aggregate risk. Second, the
bank in the lending channel model solves a more complex intertemporal optimization problem
than the nonbank intermediary in Bernanke et al. Third, the bank in the lending channel
model also faces a rising real marginal cost for producing loans. And fourth, the bank’s deposit
liabilities provide the household with direct utility because the household finds deposits useful
for facilitating transactions. Therefore, while the two models share common traits, the bank
lending channel model does not nest the Bernanke et al. model as a special case.
5.2.1 Shock to nominal reserve growth
First, I consider an exogenous shock to the growth rate of nominal nonborrowed reserves. I
suppose that the monetary policy rule is represented by:
mˆnbrt+1 = mˆ
nbr
t − pˆit + vˆmt , (5.6)
where vˆmt is the exogenous shock to reserve growth with autoregressive coefficient ρvm = 0.5.
The bank lending view of the monetary transmission mechanism suggests that a monetary
expansion increases the supply of bank loans by increasing the availability of bank deposits.
If borrowers are constrained at the margin by the supply of bank loans, then a monetary
expansion will have a greater effect on real activity than would otherwise be predicted by a
model that abstracts from bank lending. In Figures 2 - 4, I report impulse responses generated
from each model following a shock to the growth rate of reserves. I find a strong indication
that the lending channel does indeed amplify the effect of the reserve growth shock on the real
economy relative to the mechanisms in the other two comparison models.
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In order to study the effects of an exogenous shock to nominal reserve growth in the
Bernanke et al. and baseline models, I first have to characterize the demand for central bank
reserves in these models. I do this in three ways. First, I assume that the central bank
controls the supply of nonborrowed reserves instead of a general monetary aggregate that
directly enters the household utility function. Second, I suppose that the household in the
Bernanke et al. model has deposits, not central bank-issued money, in its utility function just
as I did in the lending channel model. Finally, I assume that the intermediary in the Bernanke
et al. model issues transaction deposits as its sole liability and that it is subject to a reserve
requirement. These modifications only alter how the liabilities of the central bank are used by
the agents in the model and do not change the financial accelerator or other mechanisms in
the Bernanke et al. or baseline models.
I begin by supposing that the household in the Bernanke et al. and baseline models have
utility functions described by (4.51) instead of (3.40) so that these models will have the same
deposit demand functions as the household in the lending channel model:
(
Dt+1
Pt
)σd
= ζdC
σc
t
(
Rnt+1
Rnt+1 −RDt+1
)
. (5.7)
If, as in the Bernanke et al. model, the financial intermediary is risk-neutral and if interme-
diation is a costless activity, then the nominal interest rate on reservable deposits is linked to
the nominal interest rate by:
RDt+1 = ρ+ (1− ρ)Rnt+1, (5.8)
where ρ is the required reserve ratio.5 Then, after substituting equation (5.8) into equation
(5.7) and log-linearizing, I obtain a linear demand for nonborrowed reserves:
σdmˆ
nbr
t+1 = σccˆt −
1
Rn − 1 rˆ
n
t+1. (5.9)
5To see this, set u˜(·) ≡ 1 and C(·, ·, ·) ≡ 0 in equations (4.10) and (4.11). Then note that in the Bernanke et
al. model, the expected return to lending satisfies EtR
B
t+1 = R
n
t+1.
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This reserve demand equation looks just like a standard money demand equation derived under
a money-in-the-utility assumption. Importantly, now I can use the same preference parameter
σd to describe the demand for reserves across all three models. This allows me to attribute
differences in computed impulse responses to differences in how the financial system is treated
in the models and not to differences in the demand for reserves.
The simulated impulse responses to the nominal reserve growth shock are reported in
Figures 2 - 4. The responses from each model are qualitatively consistent with conventional
understanding of how a nominal money growth shock affects aggregate activity. Higher nominal
reserve growth leads to higher growth in nominal deposits. When prices are sticky, the quantity
of real deposits also rises and this leads households to increase consumption. The additional
supply of real deposits increases the supply of loanable funds and more loanable funds leads to
greater demand for investment. Higher investment demand drives up both the price of capital
and the size of the capital stock. The increased demand for consumption and investment raises
output, labor, and the rate of inflation.
The figures clearly show the influence of the Bernanke et al. financial accelerator mecha-
nism. Relative to the impulse responses from the baseline model, the variables in the Bernanke
et al. model are more responsive to the monetary policy shock. The monetary policy shock
raises investment demand and the price of capital. The rising price of capital pushes up the
value of the capital stock that entrepreneurs owned before the monetary shock. Greater en-
trepreneurial net worth reduces the agency costs associated with loan contracting and induces
the intermediary to allocate even more capital to entrepreneurs. This is the financial accelera-
tor mechanism. Relative to the baseline model, the financial accelerator leads to an amplified
effect of the reserve growth shock on investment, output, labor and, to a lesser degree, inflation.
The bank lending channel produces a shock transmission mechanism that amplifies the
effects of the reserve growth shock relative to the Bernanke et al. financial accelerator model.
The primary difference between the lending channel model and the Bernanke et al. model is
that loan production is costly in the lending channel model. The increase in nominal reserve
growth reduces the cost of lending in two ways. First, in order to meet the increase in aggregate
demand, firms hire additional labor and increase the ratio of labor to capital. This reduces
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the marginal product of labor, reduces the real wage, and ultimately reduces the cost to
banks of hiring labor to produce loans. Second, and less importantly, the additional supply
of real reserves allows the bank to accumulate excess reserves and to further reduce the cost
of producing loans. Since the lending channel model contains the same financial accelerator
mechanism as the Bernanke et al. model, the differences between the impulse responses from
the lending channel model and the impulse responses from the Bernanke et al. model are due
to the lending channel mechanism.
Figure 4 shows the impulse responses for variables that are specific to the lending channel
model. The borrowing rate for entrepreneurs falls for three quarters after the monetary shock
in response to the increased availability of funds. The volume of real loans actually falls after
the policy shock as the increase in entrepreneurial net worth allows entrepreneurs to self-finance
a greater share of their capital projects. A decline in the demand for loans by entrepreneurs
coinciding with the expansion of nonborrowed reserves leads the bank to accumulate excess
reserves. This implication highlights a liability of the lending channel model: the model implies
perhaps too much variability in excess reserve holdings.
5.2.2 Shock to a nominal interest rate policy rule
Next I consider a shock to monetary policy when the central bank follows the nominal interest
rate rule:
rˆnt+1 = 1.5pˆit + vˆ
r
t . (5.10)
I compute the impulse responses to a 1 percent (annualized) shock to the interest rate rule.
I set the autocorrelation parameter for the shock process vˆrt to ρvr = 0.5 and I report the
impulse responses in Figures 5 - 7.
Qualitatively, the impulse responses generated from each model are typical of impulse
responses obtained from NNS models in response to a positive nominal interest rate shock.
The real interest rate rises because sticky prices prevent the inflation rate from falling to offset
the rising nominal rate. From the household’s perspective, a higher real interest rate raises
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the price of current consumption relative to future consumption and this leads households to
reduce consumption. Also, a higher real interest rate means that entrepreneurs will face greater
borrowing costs after the monetary policy shock and this leads to a reduction in investment,
the price of capital, the return on capital, and the size of the capital stock. The contraction in
aggregate demand leads to a decline in output. The reduction in the price of capital and the
return on capital increases the likelihood that any particular entrepreneur will be unable to
repay its loan and this is reflected by the increase in the default threshold for the idiosyncratic
shock ω¯t.
Once again, the effects of the financial accelerator mechanism can be seen in the differences
between the impulse responses generated from the Bernanke et al. and baseline models. Fol-
lowing the initial shock to the interest rate, the net worth of the entrepreneurial sector falls.
The cost of borrowing in the Bernanke et al. model is decreasing in entrepreneur net worth so
the policy shock raises borrowing costs and reduces the demand for investment beyond what
is predicted by the baseline model. The additional contraction in investment demand pulls
aggregate demand down further and amplifies the effect of the shock on output. Note that
there is no significant accelerator effect on household consumption.
Contrary to the reserve growth shock that I considered above, when the central bank
follows an interest rate rule, there are no important differences between the impulse responses
to a monetary policy shock produced with the lending channel model and those produced with
the Bernanke et al. model. In order to maintain the desired relationship between the nominal
interest rate and inflation, the central bank must be willing to supply reserves in order to
support its interest rate target. This means that the additional transmission mechanism in
the lending channel model doesn’t affect the central bank’s ability to stabilize real activity and
inflation after the monetary policy shock. What is affected by the lending channel mechanism,
however, is the path for the supply of reserves that the central bank must use to implement
policy. This is an important observation because it suggests that following an interest rate rule
allows the central bank to disregard the details of the lending channel transmission mechanism
when setting policy.
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5.2.3 Shock to loan default rate
In Figures 8 - 10, I plot impulse responses to a 10 percent shock to the standard deviation of
the idiosyncratic disturbance to entrepreneurial capital returns under the assumption that the
central bank sets the nominal interest rate according to equation (5.10). This shock shifts the
distribution of the idiosyncratic disturbance ωjt and creates an unanticipated increase in the
proportion of borrowers that default on their loans.6 For this reason, I refer to this shock as a
shock to the loan default rate. I set the autocorrelation coefficient of the shock to ρσ = 0.85.
The loan default rate shock has no effect on the aggregate cycle in the baseline model. In
the baseline model, the financial intermediary incurs no resource cost when an entrepreneur
defaults. This means that the loan default shock only affects the distribution of wealth across
entrepreneurs and has no effect on the aggregate return to capital. So while the loan default
shock does lead to a greater proportion of loans in default, in the baseline model the shock
has no effect on the cost of borrowing. The demand for investment is unaffected and so the
default shock has no effect on aggregate variables in the baseline model.
In contrast to the baseline model, the loan default shock does produce aggregate fluctua-
tions in the Bernanke et al. model. By creating an unanticipated increase in the proportion of
borrowers that default on their loans, the default shock leads to an immediate loss of real re-
sources because the intermediary must bear a monitoring cost to recover assets from borrowers
in default. Since the shock is persistent, the intermediary raises the cost of borrowing funds in
order to reduce the volume of loans demanded for the next period. With the reduction in the
quantity of loans demanded, the demand for new capital also falls and this pulls down the price
of capital and the return on the capital stock falls for one quarter. Household consumption
falls as the capital stock is allowed to depreciate. Output falls and gradually returns to the
steady state as the default shock dissipates.
In the lending channel model, the effects of the loan default shock are similar, but muted
compared to the effects of the default shock in the Bernanke et al. model. The muted impulse
responses arise because the bank in the lending channel model faces real marginal costs for
6See Figure 1 for an illustration of how the shock effects the distribution of ωjt .
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producing loans that are increasing at an increasing rate. This means that compared to the
intermediary in Bernanke et al., the bank in the lending channel model is less willing to adjust
the size of its loan portfolio in response to changes in the return on loans. Since the bank is
less willing to shrink its loan portfolio in response to the exogenous increase in the proportion
of borrowers that default, the lending channel acts as a dampening mechanism that operates
against the financial accelerator in the model.
An interesting consequence of the loan default shock is the persistent increase in excess
reserve holdings that follow the impact of the shock. To the extent that the build-up of excess
reserves in the U.S. economy beginning in August 2008 was a response of the banking system
to unanticipated and widespread defaults of securities on their balance sheets, then the impulse
response of excess reserves in Figure 10 suggests that the bank lending channel model with
risk-averse banking provides at least a partial explanation for that behavior.
5.2.4 Shock to government consumption
Next, I consider a 1 percent shock to government purchases with an autocorrelation coefficient
of ρg = 0.945. I plot the impulse responses in Figures 11 - 13. Across all three models, the
qualitative effects of the government consumption shock are similar. The exogenous increase
in government consumption raises aggregate demand and lifts up both inflation and output. In
order to produce the additional output, there is an immediate increase in employment which
then declines as the entrepreneurial sector accumulates capital. The additional demand for
capital raises the price of capital, raises the net worth of entrepreneurs, raises the return to
capital, and therefore reduces the proportion of entrepreneurs that default on their loans. As
with the impulse responses to the previous shocks, the influence of the financial accelerator
mechanism can be seen in the differences between the impulse responses from the Bernanke et
al. and the baseline models.
As with the impulse responses to a shock to loan defaults, the impulse responses to the
government consumption shock generated with the lending channel model are muted relative
to the responses generated from the Bernanke et al. model. The bank in the lending channel
model faces a loan production function that makes it less willing to expand its loan portfolio
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in response to the increase in the demand for loans. Because the bank holds back the supply
of loans, the lending channel attenuates the aggregate effects of the government consumption
shock relative to the Bernanke et al. model.
As depicted in Figure 13, in the lending channel model the government consumption shock
raises the non-default borrowing rate and the return to lending. The increase in government
consumption actually leads to a reduction in loans to entrepreneurs even though the capital
stock expands after the shock. This is because the jump in the return to capital – shown
in Figure 11 – produces a persistent increase in entrepreneur net worth and allows the en-
trepreneurs to self-finance a greater share of their investment purchases. Real excess reserves
fall because real lending falls. This last observation suggests a need to improve the lending
channel model: it is not plausible that banks respond to shocks to government consumption
with large fluctuations in excess reserves.
5.2.5 Shock to aggregate productivity
Finally, I compute impulse responses to a 1 percent shock to aggregate productivity with the
autocorrelation coefficient for the shock set at ρz = 0.945. I report the impulse responses in
Figures 14 - 16. The general response across the three models is similar. The productivity
shock raises the return on capital and pushes up the price of capital and entrepreneurial net
worth. Household labor input falls while the entrepreneurial sector accumulates more capital.
Inflation falls, consumption and output rise, and the proportion of entrepreneurs in default
falls – as indicated by the decline in the threshold for ωjt .
Across the three models, the responses of most variables to the productivity shock are
similar. However, differences arise. First, there is a small but noticeable accelerator effect. In
the lending channel and Bernanke et al. models, the responses of net worth, the price of capital,
investment, output, and the threshold for the idiosyncratic shock are more pronounced relative
to the baseline model. But for these same variables, the lending channel model responses
coincide closely with the responses from the Bernanke et al. model and so the lending channel
does not appear to create an important transmission channel for aggregate productivity shocks
when prices are sticky.
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However, when prices are flexible, the lending channel model does appear to have different
implications for real activity than the Bernanke et al. model. The bottom left panel of Figure
15 shows the responses of the output gap to the productivity shock. I define the output gap
as:
y˜t ≡ yˆt − yˆflext , (5.11)
where yˆflext is a benchmark measure of output representing the output that would be produced
in an equilibrium with flexible prices.7 After the productivity shock, the response of the output
gap from the lending channel model is muted relative to the response from the Bernanke et
al. model. But note that with sticky prices, the response of output from both models is similar.
This means that the response of output in the lending channel model with flexible-prices is
dampened relative to the flexible-price output response from the Bernanke et al. model. To
the extent that central bank cares about stabilizing the output gap, this observation suggests
that the Bernanke et al. model may overstate output gap variation in response to aggregate
productivity shocks.
7In Section 6.2 and Appendix C, I describe how I define and compute the output gap for models with
endogenous state variables.
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Chapter 6
Optimized Simple Interest Rate Rules
Modern macroeconomic theory emphasizes that the private sector is forward-looking: agents’
expectations about the future path of the aggregate economy determine contemporaneous
realizations of aggregate variables. This means that the effectiveness of monetary policy is
crucially linked to how the private sector forms its expectations about the future conduct
of policy. Successful monetary policymaking, therefore, requires that central banks carefully
manage the private sectors’ understanding of how policy is implemented.
One way that a central bank can manage the private sector’s understanding of policy is
for the central bank to commit itself in advance to an explicit rule for implementing monetary
policy. For example, a central bank might commit itself to following an explicit feedback rule
that links the monetary policy instrument with readily observable macroeconomic variables.
The simple linear interest rate rule proposed by Taylor (1993) has become the canonical ex-
ample of an interest rate feedback rule. Alternatively, a central bank could commit itself to a
targeting rule, whereby the central bank adjusts its policy instrument to ensure that a target
criterion – e.g. an inflation target – is always projected to be satisfied Svensson (1999). In
either case, the rule is easy to communicate to the public.
A central bank that commits to following a policy rule still faces the problem of selecting
the best rule – or optimized rule – within the chosen rule class that satisfies its policy objective.
By definition, optimized monetary policy rules are constrained-optimal. The best rule in a
given class will not, in general, be adequate for implementing the best possible outcome. But
even so, optimized rules are worth studying because rule-based monetary policy offers practical
advantages to central bankers.
A practical advantage of rule-based monetary policymaking is that commitment to a rule
can make the central bank’s actions more transparent. As Woodford (2003) points out, it is
typically difficult in practice for the private sector to use the central bank’s past behavior to
accurately forecast the future path of monetary policy. By committing itself to following a
policy rule that is easily understood by the private sector, the central bank can improve the
accuracy of the private sector’s forecasts of policy by removing the uncertainty about how
the central bank will respond to future developments in the aggregate economy. In practice,
commitment to a policy rule could also enhance the central bank’s credibility by allowing the
public to evaluate, ex post, how well the central bank adheres to its specified rule.
In this chapter I use the lending channel model developed above to study optimized interest
rate rules for conducting monetary policy. I restrict my attention to a set of simple rules that
equate the nominal interest rate to a linear function of endogenous and exogenous variables.
I consider several classes of simple linear rules and, within each rule class, I look for the rule
that optimizes an assumed policy objective function. I compute optimized interest rate rules
for the lending channel, Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999), and baseline models. I then
compare the coefficients for the optimized interest rate rules from each model to determine
to what extent the models produce different implications for the form of optimized monetary
policy rules.
6.1 The central bank’s problem
I assume that the central bank has preferences over expected inflation, output, and nominal
interest rate variability represented by:
Vt = Et
∞∑
s=0
βs
{
pˆi2t+s + λyy˜
2
t+s + λr
[
rˆnt+s
]2}
, (6.1)
where β is the same subjective discount factor that the household uses to discount future
utility flows. The constants λy and λr reflect the relative weights that the central bank assigns
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to output gap and nominal interest rate variation. I define the output gap y˜t as:
y˜t ≡ yˆt − yˆflext , (6.2)
where yˆflext is a benchmark measure of output (in log-deviations) associated with a flexible-
price equilibrium.1 In the basic new-Keynesian model without capital, the flexible-price equi-
librium level of output has a natural definition and can be written as a function of the exogenous
state. However, in models with endogenous state variables - like the lending channel model -
the flexible-price equilibrium output level does not have an obvious definition. Below, I explain
why this is and I discuss how I overcome the issue.
It is common to assume that central banks desire to stabilize both inflation and output
variation. Households receive utility from consuming output and from enjoying leisure. In an
environment characterized by monopolistic competition and staggered price-setting, nonzero
inflation creates dispersion in the relative prices of individual goods. Because households
have diminishing marginal utility, price dispersion leads to a reduction in household utility.
Furthermore, households dislike output variability relative to the flexible-price benchmark
because it implies a greater variation in leisure time than would be realized in an environment
with flexible prices.
In addition to inflation and output stabilization, I have assumed also that the central bank’s
objectives extend to stabilizing the nominal interest rate.2 I incorporate this additional term
because it reflects how the opportunity cost of holding money varies with the nominal interest
rate.3
1Note that for the models considered in this paper, yˆflext will not generally coincide with the efficient level of
output. This is because the effects of monopolistic competition among retail firms and the costs of monitoring
loans will cause the flexible-price equilibrium to be inefficiently low.
2Note that I am not assuming that the central bank has preferences for smoothing the path of the nominal
interest rate.
3Woodford (2003) shows how to derive an expression like (6.1) as an approximation to the representative
household’s expected lifetime utility in a specific small new-Keynesian model where money is used to reduce
transaction frictions.
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I restrict my attention to linear interest rate feedback rules of the general form:
rˆnt+1 =
∑
i
ςiXi,t +
∑
j
ςjfj,t, (6.3)
where Xi,t is the ith element in the vector of endogenous variables and fj,t is the jth element
in the vector of exogenous variables. The policy rule coefficients ςi and ςj are choice variables
for the central bank. Below, I consider several special cases of (6.3) by imposing restrictions
on the coefficient values that are available to the central bank. For example, by requiring that
all of the coefficients in (6.3) equal zero except for the coefficients on inflation and output, I
obtain a simple Taylor-type policy rule.
I suppose that the central bank chooses the linear coefficients in (6.3) to minimize:
E(Vt) = E
[
Et
∞∑
s=0
βs
{
pˆi2t+s + λyy˜
2
t+s + λr
[
rˆnt+s
]2}]
, (6.4)
subject to (6.3), the set of linearized structural model equations listed in Appendix A, and
the requirement that the optimized rule produces a unique and stable rational expectations
equilibrium. By specifying the policy objective this way, I find policies that are optimal within
a specific class of rules from the perspective of a central bank having no knowledge of the
current state of the economy.
My characterization of the policy objective is different from other studies in the optimal
monetary policy literature. It is more commonly assumed that the initial state is relevant
to the policy decision by instead supposing that central banks minimize a function like (6.1)
that contains expectations of future loss conditional on period t information (See, for example,
Rotemberg and Woodford (1999), Salemi (2006).). However, my approach is not without
precedent. Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2007) study optimized policy rules under each loss
function assumption. They find that their conclusions about monetary policy are not sensitive
to whether they assume that the central bank minimizes the conditional or unconditional
expected loss function.
Notice that by using the law of iterated expectations, the objective to be minimized can
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be rewritten as:
E(Vt) = (1− β)−1 [Var(pit) + λyVar(y˜t) + λrVar(rˆtn)] , (6.5)
where Var(pit), Var(y˜t), and Var(rˆt
n) are the unconditional variances of inflation, the output
gap, and the nominal interest rate. For a given policy, these statistics can be computed using
the reduced form matrices recovered from the Klein solution method.4
6.2 The output gap measure
The basic new-Keynesian model abstracts from capital accumulation and describes output
production as a function of only a labor input and an exogenous productivity process.5 Under
the assumption of flexible prices, the state of the economy in each period can be fully char-
acterized by the realized values of exogenous disturbances. The flexible-price equilibrium is
unambiguously independent of past endogenous variables when the model has no endogenous
state variables. In this case, the output gap defined by equation (6.2) compares actual output
with the output that would have been produced if prices were to become flexible in the current
period.
In a model with endogenous variables in the state vector, the appropriate way to define a
flexible-price equilibrium is less clear. One option, suggested by Neiss and Nelson (2003), is to
define the flexible-price level of output in each period as the equilibrium level of output that
would prevail if prices had always been flexible. According to this definition, the flexible-price
equilibrium is a function of exogenous shocks and an endogenous state that was determined
in the previous period under flexible prices. This is where a potential problem with their
definition arises. The terms being compared in the output gap definition (6.2) will have been
determined by different histories of the endogenous state. When the flexible-price equilibrium
in each period is determined by an endogenous state vector that diverges from the endogenous
4See Appendix D.
5See Gal´ı (2003) or Walsh (2003) for an exposition of the basic new Keynesian model.
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state vector of the sticky-price economy, the flexible-price level of output no longer represents
a reasonable output benchmark for the sticky-price economy given its endogenous state.
An alternative approach suggested by Woodford (2003) is to define the flexible-price equi-
librium in each period as the equilibrium that would arise if prices were expected to be perfectly
flexible forever while taking as given the current realization of the endogenous state vector of
the sticky-price model. This definition makes the flexible-price equilibrium more directly com-
parable to the sticky-price equilibrium because both are contingent upon identical histories.
For my analysis, I adopt Woodford’s definition of the flexible-price equilibrium. In Appendix
C, I describe explicitly how I use the Klein solution method to compute the flexible-price
equilibrium.
6.3 Optimized interest rate rules
Now I compute optimized interest rate rules that minimize the central bank’s unconditional
expected loss represented by equation (6.4). I consider four subclasses of rules within the
general class of linear rules described by equation (6.3). First, I consider two simple Taylor-
type feedback rules. These types of rules are standard in the monetary policy rule literature
and provide a useful starting point. Next, after observing that capital and entrepreneurial
net worth are important state variables in the Bernanke et al. and lending channel models, I
consider a rule that augments a basic Taylor-type rule with capital and net worth. Finally, I
examine a rule optimized for the lending channel model that includes excess reserves and the
non-default borrowing rate.
In order to compute rules that minimize equation (6.4), I have to first select values for the
parameters in the central bank’s loss function. I follow Woodford (1999) and set the coeffi-
cient on the output gap λy to 0.048. Woodford obtains this value by referring to the work
of Rotemberg and Woodford (1997,1999). Using the small new-Keynesian model developed
in Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) use a second-order ap-
proximation to the household’s expected utility function to derive a central bank loss function
that is quadratic in inflation and the output gap. The coefficients in the derived quadratic loss
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function are functions of structural model parameters. Woodford (1999) uses the structural
estimates from Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) to arrive at his value for λy.
For the coefficient on the nominal interest rate λr, I again follow Woodford (1999) and
set this value to 0.236. Woodford justifies this value on two grounds. First, fluctuations in
the nominal interest rate lead to fluctuations in the opportunity cost of holding money. By
placing weight on interest rate variation, the central bank balances stabilizing the public’s cost
of holding money against the central bank’s other objectives. Second, by sufficiently stabilizing
the nominal interest rate, the central bank can reduce the likelihood that the nominal interest
rate violates the zero-lower bound.
The lending channel model that I have described above has three exogenous shocks: a shock
to aggregate productivity, a shock to government consumption, and a loan default shock.6
When I compute optimized monetary policy rules, I also introduce an exogenous shock to the
Phillips curve. I replace the Phillips curve in equation (A.25) with:
pˆit = βEtpˆit+1 − κxˆt + uˆt, (6.6)
where uˆt is an AR(1) exogenous shock process with autoregressive coefficient ρu. There are
several ways to derive an expression like equation (6.6) from microeconomic foundations, but
here I make no claims about the structural origin of the shock uˆt.
7 In the computational
exercises below, I use estimates from Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2009) to calibrate the
parameters describing the evolution of uˆt. I set ρu to 0.723 and the standard deviation of uˆt
to 0.0147.
6Recall that the loan default shock is a shock to the standard deviation of the idiosyncratic disturbance to
entrepreneurs’ capital returns.
7For example, Ireland (2004) assumes that the elasticity of substitution across differentiated retail goods is
stochastic. This ultimately gives rise to a forward looking Phillips curve like (6.6). In this case, the shock to
the Phillips curve is interpreted as an exogenous shock to the degree of market power an individual firm has
and creates exogenous movement in the markup. See DeJong and Dave (2007).
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6.3.1 Simple Taylor-type rules
The first monetary policy rule that I consider is the simple feedback rule given by:
rˆnt+1 = ςpipˆit + (ςy/4) yˆt. (6.7)
This rule specifies the nominal interest rate as a linear function of the contemporaneous infla-
tion rate and the deviation of output from its steady state. This rule is interesting because
it closely resembles Taylor’s (1993) simple interest rate rule. It is also worth examining as a
starting point because similar rules have been studied in the context of modern new-Keynesian
and new neoclassical synthesis models.
Notice that rule (6.7) specifies the nominal interest rate as a linear function of the deviation
of output from its steady state value rather than as a function of the output gap. I specify the
rule this way to acknowledge that the output gap is difficult to measure in practice because
it requires knowledge about the flexible-price allocation Gal´ı (2003). Also, I follow Schmitt-
Grohe´ and Uribe (2007) and further restrict the set of admissible rules by only searching over
rules with coefficients in the interval [0,3] because large or negative coefficients in the policy
rule could make the rule difficult to communicate with the private sector in practice.8 For the
most part, the upper bound does not constrain the policy rules that I obtain.
In Table 3, I report optimized coefficients for the baseline, Bernanke et al., and lending
channel models within the class of rules given by (6.7). Given the simple rule class under
consideration, the general policy prescription across all three models is for the central bank
to lean against inflation and to disregard fluctuations in output. The baseline model has no
financial frictions and, in particular, lacks the financial accelerator mechanism that amplifies
the effects of monetary policy. Accordingly, the optimized response to inflation within the
class of rules given by (6.7) is greater in the baseline model than in the Bernanke et al. and
baseline models.
To illustrate how the selection of the policy rule parameters ςpi and ςy affects the central
8Note this constraint means that ςy ∈ [0, 12].
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bank’s loss function and its components, I use the lending channel model to plot the uncondi-
tional variance surfaces of inflation, the output gap, output relative to steady state, and the
nominal interest rate. The variance surfaces are plotted in Figures 23 – 26. Figure 23 shows
that the variance of inflation is strictly decreasing with the strength of the central bank’s
reaction to changes in inflation . The variance of inflation is increasing in the coefficient on
output. Alternatively, as indicated by Figure 24, the variance of the output gap is increasing
in the weight that the central bank places on inflation stabilization. The central bank faces
a tradeoff between output and inflation stabilization. The stabilization tradeoff is reflected in
the shape of the central bank’s loss function. The surface of the loss function is plotted in
Figure 27. Note that the loss function has a clear minimum at which the coefficient on output
is up against the zero-bound that I impose.
Next, I augment the simple rule in (6.7) to include a policy response coefficient for the
lagged nominal interest rate:
rˆnt+1 = ςpipˆit + (ςy/4) yˆt + ςrrˆ
n
t . (6.8)
I report the optimized coefficient values in Table 4. Across all three models, the policy pre-
scription is for the central bank to lean away from inflation and heavily towards interest rate
stabilization. In the lending channel and baseline models, the optimized response coefficients
on output rise above the response to inflation. This does not mean that inflation stabilization
is not still a priority for the central bank: across all three models, the variance of inflation falls
once the policy rule is augmented to include interest rate smoothing. Stabilizing the nominal
interest rate actually allows for better inflation stabilization.
6.3.2 Simple Taylor-type rules: no cost-push shock
Now, I examine the same two simple interest rate rules from the pervious section under the
assumption that the cost-push shock equals zero at all dates. I do this for two reasons. First,
neither the Bernanke et al. model nor the lending channel model that I developed above has
a cost-push shock. Second, Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2007) study optimized simple interest
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rules in a new-Keynesian model with capital that is similar to the baseline model that I study.
Like the models that I describe above, the Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe model does not have a
structural source for a cost-push shock either. By studying optimized rules in the lending
channel model without cost-push shocks, I am able to more easily compare my results with
the results from Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe.
In Table 5 I report optimized coefficients for simple rules within the class given by (6.7)
for all three models. Without a cost-push shock, the policy prescription is identical across
all models. The central bank should lean completely and only on inflation. To illustrate why
this is, I have plotted in Figures 18 – 21 the unconditional variance surfaces of inflation, the
output gap, output relative to steady state, and the nominal interest rate using the lending
channel model. The variance of the three variables that enter the central bank loss function –
inflation, the output gap, and the nominal interest rate – are all decreasing in the coefficient
on inflation and increasing in the coefficient on output. As suggested by the plot of the loss
function in Figure 22, the central bank’s loss function decreases rapidly with the coefficient on
inflation in the interest rate rule.
The loss function plotted in Figure 22 also shows that the loss function becomes flat
for sufficiently large inflation coefficients. When I computed unconstrained coefficients for the
simple policy rule, I found that the coefficient on inflation in the policy rule was driven towards
machine infinity. This is because in the models without a cost push shock, the central bank
does not face a tradeoff between output and inflation stabilization. Given the plots of the
variance surfaces, it is apparent that the central bank needs only to lean against inflation to
minimize its expected loss. This result is consistent with the conclusions of Kollmann (2008)
and Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2007). Both studies examine simple monetary policy rules in
a new-Keynesian model with capital and find very large coefficients on inflation in optimized
interest rate rules. Kollmann, for example, finds that a coefficient on inflation of 8660.77 is
optimal. The general conclusion from my work and related studies then is that when cost-push
shocks are not present, an optimized simple rule features a heavy response to inflation and no
response to output.
For completeness, I also compute optimized coefficients for the rule with interest rate
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smoothing under the assumption of no cost-push shocks. I report the coefficients in Table
6. The constrained optimized rules in the class represented by (6.8) for all three models
feature significant interest rate smoothing while still placing the maximum allowable weight
on inflation.
6.3.3 More general interest rate rules
The rules that I considered in the previous section are interesting because they belong to a
class of simple rules often analyzed in the optimal policy literature. Simple rules have the
advantage of being easy to understand by the public. Also, in some macroeconomic models, a
rule from the class of rules represented by either (6.7) or (6.8) may be sufficient for the central
bank to implement the macroeconomic outcome it desires. Indeed, Rotemberg and Woodford
(1999) show that in their model, a simple rule in the form of (6.8) provides a reasonably close
approximation to the optimal state-contingent policy plan.
However, compared with the model of Rotemberg and Woodford (1999), the equilibrium
relationships for the models that I have been working with in this paper are more complicated
and it is not clear that a simple rule with a form of (6.7) or (6.8) is sufficient for the central
bank to implement its policy objectives. The lending channel, Bernanke et al., and baseline
models all have endogenous state variables that may usefully be incorporated into the central
bank’s interest rate rule. In this section I consider two policy rules that incorporate additional
state variables into the policy rules that I considered in the previous sections. Throughout the
section I continue to maintain the assumption that there are shocks to the Phillips curve.
The first of the more generalized rules that I consider is of the form:
rˆnt+1 = ςkkˆt + ςnnˆt + ςyyˆt + ςpipˆit + ςz zˆt + ςg gˆt + ςuuˆt + ςσσˆω,t. (6.9)
This rule is a generalization of rule (6.7). I assume that the central bank can directly observe
the vector of exogenous shocks and so I allow the central bank to respond directly to changes
in aggregate productivity, government consumption, the cost-push shock, and the shock to
loan defaults. In the three models that I work with, the capital stock and entrepreneurial net
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worth are endogenous state variables that are potentially important sources of information for
the central bank. The capital stock influences the productive capacity of goods producers,
while entrepreneurial net worth is an indicator of borrowing costs because the external finance
premium is decreasing in entrepreneurial net worth.
I report the optimized policy rule coefficients for rule (6.9) in Table 7. For the three
models that I have considered, the qualitative results are similar. The optimized rule features
a small negative coefficient on entrepreneurial net worth, a small positive coefficient on the
cost-push shock, and a positive response to inflation. The coefficients on capital, productivity,
government consumption, and the loan default shock are computed to be positive but close to
zero.
It is not necessarily intuitive that the coefficient on net worth should be negative for the
optimized rules reported in Table 7. The policy prescription appears to be that the central
bank should respond to any increase in entrepreneurial net worth by reducing the nominal
interest rate. Given the positive relationship between net worth and the cost of borrowing in
the lending channel and the Bernanke et al. models, such a policy prescription would appear
to be destabilizing and at odds with the central bank’s objectives. But such an interpretation
of the implications of the optimized coefficient on net worth is not correct because there is
no shock in the model that produces an exogenous increase in entrepreneur net worth. If
there were such a shock – such as the entrepreneurial wealth shock proposed by Carlstrom
and Fuerst (1997), then the coefficients reported in Table 7 might well be computed to be very
different values and possibly with opposite sign.
A closer examination of the coefficients that are reported in Table 7 reveals that for each
model, the optimized coefficient on inflation is about two orders of magnitude greater in abso-
lute value than the coefficient on net worth. As with the more simple optimized interest rate
rules considered earlier, the policy prescription is still to lean most strongly against inflation.
But, according to Table 7, the central bank is advised to respond less strongly to inflation that
is accompanied by an increase in net worth. Or alternatively, the central bank is advised to
lean more intensively against inflation that is accompanied by lower net worth. This policy
prescription gives the central bank the capability to tailor its response to inflation based on the
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source of the inflation. In particular, under this policy recommendation, the central bank will
respond more aggressively to inflation driven by cost-push shocks than to inflation produced
by shocks to aggregate productivity or government consumption.
For each model, the coefficient on inflation in the optimized rule is less than the coefficient
that I obtained for the simple Taylor-type rule given by (6.7). Since there are four exogenous
shocks, an increase in inflation my be caused by one four factors and the central bank will not
want to respond to each cause in the same way. Partially shifting the weight in the policy rule
away from inflation and towards the cost-push shock allows the central bank to better tailor
policy specifically to the cause of the inflation increase.
In Table 7, the different magnitudes for the optimized coefficients on net worth, inflation,
and the cost-push shock reflect the differences across the models being considered. The baseline
model is essentially a new neoclassical synthesis model without financial frictions. The baseline
model specifically lacks an accelerator mechanism and so stabilizing the effects of a given
shock in the baseline models requires a stronger policy response relative to the other two
models. Relative to the Bernanke et al. model, the mechanisms in the lending channel model
dampen the real effects of the government consumption shock and the loan default shock while
slightly amplifying the effects of the cost-push shock. The asymmetry of the lending channel
transmission mechanism leads to the lower coefficient on the cost-push shock for the lending
channel model in Table 7 and to the greater coefficient – in absolute value terms – on net
worth.
Finally, I consider a rule designed specifically for the lending channel model. Excess reserves
and the non-default borrowing rate for entrepreneurs are elements of the state vector in the
lending channel model that are not in the baseline or Bernanke et al. models. To see if these
additional variables are useful for policy, I consider the rule:
rˆnt+1 = ςkkˆt + ςnnˆt + ςmexmˆ
ex
t + ςr¯ ˆ¯rt + ςyyˆt + ςpipˆit + ςz zˆt + ςg gˆt + ςuuˆt + ςσσˆω,t.(6.10)
I report the results in Table 8. The coefficients on excess reserves and the borrowing rate
are computed to be positive but close to zero. The coefficients on the other variables in the
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rule essentially match the values obtained for the previous rule. The optimized version of
rule (6.10) allows the central bank to better stabilize inflation compared to rule (6.9), but the
practical gains are small. Even if the lending channel model were a better representation of
the macroeconomic environment, a central bank would be essentially just as well off if it were
to commit to an optimized in the form of (6.9) instead of one like rule (6.10).
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
In this dissertation, I have developed a model that emphasizes the role of bank lending in
transmitting exogenous shocks through the aggregate cycle. I analyzed the implications of
the model in two ways. First, I used the model to compute simulated impulse responses and
compared these impulse responses to those generated from the Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist
(1999) model. And second, I used the bank lending channel model to compute coefficients for
optimized monetary policy rules. I summarize my primary conclusions below.
I draw three broad conclusions by comparing the impulse responses computed from the
lending channel model to those computed using the Bernanke et al. and baseline models. The
first and most important conclusion is that the mechanisms of the lending channel model lead
to endogenous fluctuations in excess reserve holdings over the aggregate cycle. In particular,
simulations of the lending channel model show that banks increase excess reserve holdings
in response to an unanticipated increase in the proportion of bank loans in default. This
observation suggests that the bank lending channel model with risk-averse banks is a useful
step toward the development of a model that explains the behavior of the banking system in
the period leading up to the Great Recession.
The second conclusion that I draw from the dynamic simulations is that the lending channel
model generally preserves many of the shock transmission mechanisms of the Bernanke et
al. model. The Bernanke et al. model is widely regarded as the canonical model of how financial
frictions influence shock transmission through the business cycle. Given the empirical evidence
for a financial accelerator transmission mechanism in the U.S. economy Bernanke and Gertler
(1995), it is a strength of the lending channel model that it retains a financial accelerator
mechanism in the dynamics of “standard” variables – e.g. output, inflation, investment, and
so on – while also producing endogenous fluctuations in excess reserve holdings.
Finally, my third conclusion from the dynamic simulations is that the lending channel
model lends support to the lending channel hypothesis of Kashyap and Stein (1994). Kashyap
and Stein argue that a contraction in the supply of nonborrowed reserves reduces the supply of
bank loans by reducing the availability of reservable deposits. In their view, the bank lending
channel should amplify the effects of a change in the supply of reserves on aggregate activity.
While Kashyap and Stein (2000) find evidence that monetary policy directly affects the supply
of loans on a micro-level, they admit that they cannot conclude that the lending channel is
relevant on the aggregate-level because they do not have an explicit model of banking in the
aggregate cycle. The model that I have presented provides theoretical support for Kashyap
and Stein’s hypothesis by showing that the effects of shocks to the growth rate of nominal
reserves are amplified in the lending channel model.
After examining the simulated impulse responses from the lending channel model, I used
the lending channel model to compute optimized coefficients for several simple interest rate
rules for monetary policy. The literature on optimized monetary policy rules is large, but that
literature has paid little attention to if and how the presence of financial frictions affects the
properties of optimized policy rules. In my dissertation, I help to fill this gap by computing
optimized monetary policy rules for the lending channel model, the financial accelerator model
of Bernanke et al., and the baseline model without financial frictions. My results are consistent
with the findings of previous studies that characterize optimized monetary policy rules in
modern monetary models without financial frictions.
The primary conclusion that I draw from studying optimized interest rate rules is that
the financial factors in the lending channel and Bernanke et al. models do not appear to have
important consequences for the characterization of optimized monetary policy rules. Across
the three models that I study, I find that in the presence of a cost-push shock – or a shock to
the Phillips curve – an optimized interest rate rule features a greater than one-for-one response
to inflation and a small response to output. In the case where there is no shock to the Phillips
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curve, the optimized policy rule for all three models is characterized by an arbitrarily large
coefficient on inflation and no response to output. This second observation confirms that
the results of Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2007) and Kollmann (2008) are robust to models
incorporating more detailed representation of the financial sector. This is reasonable since all
three of the models that I consider share a common new-neoclassical synthesis ancestor with
the model of Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe and the model Kollmann.
While the bank lending channel model that I have developed in this dissertation is valuable
because it is capable of explaining why excess reserves held in the banking system might vary
endogenously over the business cycle, it is surely not the final account of the interaction between
banking system and the aggregate economy. As it stands, the model clearly has liabilities and
these liabilities present opportunities for future research.
One obvious liability of the lending channel model is that it implies too much variation in
excess reserve holdings. Historically, excess reserves in the U.S. have not varied significantly
over the business cycle, but the lending channel model that I have proposed predicts substantial
excess reserve movement in response to any of the exogenous shocks to the model. This is
because the bank that I model uses excess reserves as the sole nominally risk-free asset for
managing risk on its overall asset portfolio. I suspect that by adding an additional risk-free
and interest-bearing asset – like government bonds – to the model, I can reduce the implied
variability of excess reserves in the model because the bank would then have an additional
asset to use as a hedge against risk. But this is only a conjecture, and something to keep in
mind for future work as I continue to develop and refine the lending channel model.
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Appendix A
Linearized Equilibrium Conditions for the
Lending Channel Model
From the lending channel model, I obtain 26 equations representing the linearized equilibrium
conditions governing the evolution of 26 endogenous variables. Hatted Greek and Roman
letters represent log-deviations of model variables from their steady state values. Capital
letters without time subscripts denote steady state values. Twelve conditions are novel to the
model I have proposed. The remaining fourteen equations have close analogues in Bernanke
et al. The novel equations are:
0 = rˆKt + pˆit +
N
K −N
(
nˆt − qˆt−1 − kˆt
)
+
Γω(ω¯|σ2ω)− µGω(ω¯|σ2ω)
Γ(ω¯|σ2ω)− µG(ω¯|σ2ω)
· ω¯ · ˆ¯ωt
+
Γσ(ω¯|σ2ω)− µGσ(ω¯|σ2ω)
Γ(ω¯|σ2ω)− µG(ω¯|σ2ω)
· 2 · σ2ω · σˆω,t − rˆBt (A.1)
mex
b+mex
mˆext+1 +
b
b+mex
bˆt+1 = dˆt+1 (A.2)
mˆnbrt+1 −
mex
mnbr
mˆext+1 =
ρd
mnbr
dˆt+1 (A.3)
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Rn −RD rˆ
n
t+1 = σccˆt − σddˆt+1 +
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Rn −RD rˆ
D
t+1 (A.4)
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1−Rff
)
mexmˆext
−
[(
RB −Rff
)
b+
(
1−Rff
)
mex
]
pˆit − CW · w · wˆt
− (b+mex)Rff rˆfft −
Λb
u˜′′(Φ¯)
Λˆbt (A.8)
{
λcΛbR¯
N
K
(
Γωω(ω¯|σ2ω)− µGωω(ω¯|σ2ω)
)
+ λcΛbRK
(
Γω(ω¯|σ2ω)− µGω(ω¯|σ2ω)
)
−Γω(ω¯|σ2ω)RK − Γωω(ω¯|σ2ω)R¯
N
K
}
ω¯Et ˆ¯ωt+1
+
{
λcΛb
(
Γω(ω¯|σ2ω)− µGω(ω¯|σ2ω)
)− Γω(ω¯|σ2ω)}R¯NK (ˆ¯rt+1 + nˆt+1 − qˆt − kˆt+1 − Etpˆit+1)
+
{
1− Γ(ω¯|σ2ω) + λcΛb
(
Γ(ω¯|σ2ω)− µG(ω¯|σ2ω)
)}
RKEtrˆ
K
t+1
+
{(
Γω(ω¯|σ2ω)− µGω(ω¯|σ2ω)
)
R¯
N
K
+
(
Γ(ω¯|σ2ω)− µG(ω¯|σ2ω)
)
RK
}
λcΛbEtΛˆ
b
t+1
= λcΞΞˆt −
{
Λb
(
Γω(ω¯|σ2ω)− µGω(ω¯|σ2ω)
)
R¯
N
K
+ Λb
(
Γ(ω¯|σ2ω)− µG(ω¯|σ2ω)
)
RK − Ξ
}
λcλˆct
−
{
λcΛbR¯
N
K
(
Γωσ(ω¯|σ2ω)− µGωσ(ω¯|σ2ω)
)
+ λcΛbRK
(
Γσ(ω¯|σ2ω)− µGσ(ω¯|σ2ω)
)
−Γσ(ω¯|σ2ω)RK − Γωσ(ω¯|σ2ω)R¯
N
K
}
· 2 · σ2ωEtσˆω,t+1 (A.9)
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EtΛˆ
b
t +
Γω(ω¯|σ2ω)− µGω(ω¯|σ2ω)
Γ(ω¯|σ2ω)− µG(ω¯|σ2ω)
ω¯Et ˆ¯ωt+1 + Etrˆ
K
t+1 +
N
K −N nˆt+1 −
N
K −N
(
qˆt + kˆt+1
)
= Ξˆt − Γσ(ω¯|σ
2
ω)− µGσ(ω¯|σ2ω)
Γ(ω¯|σ2ω)− µG(ω¯|σ2ω)
· 2 · σ2ω · Etσˆω,t+1 (A.10)
0 =
N
K −N
[
qˆt−1 + kˆt − nˆt
]
+ ˆ¯rt − ˆ¯ωt − pˆit − rˆKt (A.11)
[
Γωω(ω¯|σ2ω)− µGωω(ω¯|σ2ω)
Γω(ω¯|σ2ω)− µGω(ω¯|σ2ω)
− Γωω(ω¯|σ
2
ω)
Γω(ω¯|σ2ω)
]
ω¯ · Et ˆ¯ωt+1 + EtΛˆbt+1
= −λˆct −
[
Γωσ(ω¯|σ2ω)− µGωσ(ω¯|σ2ω)
Γω(ω¯|σ2ω)− µGω(ω¯|σ2ω)
− Γωσ(ω¯|σ
2
ω)
Γω(ω¯|σ2ω)
]
· 2 · σ2ω · Etσˆω,t+1 (A.12)
The remaining equations are:
kˆt+1 = διˆt + (1− δ) kˆt (A.13)
nˆt+1 = N
lc
rkqk
(
rˆKt + qˆt−1 + kˆt
)
+Nlcω ˆ¯ωt +N
lc
wewˆ
e
t +N
lc
σ σˆω,t (A.14)
qˆt = ϕιˆt − ϕkˆt (A.15)
ϑqˆt = rˆ
K
t + (1− ϑ)xˆt + (1− ϑ)kˆt − (1− ϑ)yˆt + qˆt−1 (A.16)
σcEtcˆt+1 + Etpˆit+1 − rˆnt+1 = σccˆt (A.17)
0 = yˆt − (1 + (η − 1)H)(1−H)−1hˆt − σccˆt − xˆt (A.18)
0 = αkˆt + (1− α)Ωhˆt − yˆt + zˆt (A.19)
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0 =
C
Y
cˆt +
I
Y
ιˆt +
Ce
Y
cˆet − yˆt +Ylcrkqk
[
rˆKt + qˆt−1 + kˆt
]
+Ylcω ˆ¯ωt +Y
lc
σ σˆω,t +
G
Y
gˆt (A.20)
1− γ
γ
N
Ce
nˆt+1 = cˆ
e
t −
1− γ
γ
W e
Ce
wˆet (A.21)
0 = yˆt − hˆt − xˆt − wˆt (A.22)
K
K −N
[
kˆt+1 + qˆt
]
− N
K −N nˆt+1 − bt+1 = 0 (A.23)
0 = yˆt − xˆt − wˆet (A.24)
βEtpˆit+1 = pˆit + κxˆt − uˆt (A.25)
And one of two policies
rˆnt+1 = ςrrˆ
n
t + ςpipˆit + ςyyˆt + v
r
t (A.26)
or:
mˆt+1 = mˆ
nbr
t − pˆit + vmt (A.27)
where:
ϑ ≡ 1− δ
αY/XK + 1− δ (A.28)
ϕ ≡ Φ
′′(I/K)
Φ′(I/K)
I
K
(A.29)
κ ≡ (1− θ)(1− βθ)
θ
(A.30)
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and:
N1rkq ≡
γRKK
N
[
1− Γ(ω¯|σ2ω)
]
(A.31)
N1zhx ≡
(1− α)(1− Ω)Y
NX
(A.32)
N1ω ≡ −
γRKK
N
[
Γω(ω¯|σ2ω)
]
ω¯ (A.33)
N1σ ≡ −
γRKK
N
[
Γσ(ω¯|σ2ω)
] · 2 · σ2ω (A.34)
N1k ≡ N1rkq + αN1zhx (A.35)
Y1rkqk ≡ µRKKG(ω¯|σ2ω)/Y (A.36)
Y1ω ≡ µRKKGω(ω¯|σ2ω)ω¯/Y (A.37)
Y1σ ≡ µRKKGσ(ω¯|σ2ω) · 2 · σ2ω/Y (A.38)
Ce1n ≡
(1− γ)N
γ
(A.39)
Ce1zkhx ≡ Ce −Ce1n (A.40)
Equation (A.1) defines the nominal return on the bank’s loan portfolio. Naturally, this
is increasing in the aggregate return to capital and inflation. The presence of equilibrium
loan defaults causes the nominal return on loans to also be decreasing in the size of the loan
portfolio at the margin. Finally, the return on loans is decreasing in ω¯t – the proportion
of entrepreneurs in default – and σω,t – the standard deviation of the idiosyncratic shock
to entrepreneurial returns. This last observation shows an important mechanism by which
fluctuations in loan default probabilities enter into the bank’s optimization problem.
Equation (A.2) is the bank’s balance sheet identity and equation (A.3) reflects the re-
quirement that the supply of nonborrowed reserves must equal the sum of excess and required
reserves held by banks. Equation (A.4) is the household’s supply of real deposits. Deposit
supply is increasing in household consumption and decreasing in the cost of holding deposits.
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This cost is measured by the spread between the deposit and nominal rate. Since the house-
hold finds deposits useful for saving wealth and for completing transactions, banks can borrow
funds from the household at a cost below the nominal rate.
Next, equation (A.5) combines the bank’s first-order conditions for receiving deposits and
making loans. Equation (A.6) is a combination of the bank’s first order conditions for holding
excess reserves and making loans. Equation (A.7) is the bank’s first-order condition for ac-
cepting deposits. These equations, together with the definition of the banker’s marginal utility
(A.8), describe the bank’s optimal behavior. The banker’s marginal utility is determined by
the net return on is financial portfolio originated in the previous period and the cost of origi-
nating a new portfolio in the current period. As (A.5) and (A.6) indicate, the bank’s problem is
intertemporal and optimal behavior depends on the curvature of the banker’s utility function.
The banker cares about smoothing its marginal utility across time and, as (A.8) suggests, it
uses excess reserves to do so when confronted with unanticipated losses.
Finally, equations (A.9), (A.10), (A.11), and (A.12) are equilibrium conditions from the
bank’s optimal loan contracting problem. First, (A.9) is the first-order condition for the
amount of capital the entrepreneurs purchase under the optimal contract. Second, (A.10) is
the constraint that the bank’s expected return from lending equal its opportunity cost of funds.
Next, (A.11) is the definition of the stochastic default threshold ˆ¯ωt. This determines
the proportion of entrepreneurs that default on their loans each period. This proportion is
decreasing in the price of capital, the capital stock, and the borrowing rate. Equation (A.11)
shows how the debt-deflation story of Fisher (1933) enters into the present model. Falling
inflation raises the real debt burden of entrepreneurs and, other things equal, pushes up the
proportion of entrepreneurs in default. This in turn drives down entrepreneur net worth and
drives up defaults in the following period. Finally, (A.12) is the first-order condition for the
non-default borrowing rate in the contracting problem.
The remaining equations either have direct ancestors in Bernanke et al. or are common
features in business cycle models. These equations are discussed in Chapter 3.
Now, I characterize the evolution of the four exogenous variables: the aggregate produc-
tivity process zˆt, the government consumption process gˆt, the monetary policy shock vˆ
r
t , and
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the volatility of the idiosyncratic productivity shock σˆω,t:
zˆt = ρz zˆt−1 + εzt (A.41)
gˆt = ρg gˆt−1 + ε
g
t (A.42)
vˆrt = ρvrvˆ
r
t−1 + ε
v
t (A.43)
σˆω,t+1 = ρσσˆω,t + ε
σ
t (A.44)
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Appendix B
Model Solution
B.1 The general linear dynamic model
Linear approximations to the equilibrium conditions of a broad class of dynamic stochastic
macroeconomic models can be expressed in the form:
AEtxt+1 = Bxt + Cft +Dut, (B.1)
where xt is a vector of n endogenous variables, ft is a vector of nf exogenous variables, and
ut is a vector of nu policy instrument variables.
1 The variables in xt are grouped so that xt
can be written as:
xt =
 x1t
x2t
 , (B.2)
where x1t is a vector nk of predetermined variables and x2t is a vector of (n − nk) nonprede-
termined variables. Here, a variable zt+1 is called predetermined at date t if Etzt+1 = zt+1.
2
The vector ft is a stationary VAR(1) process with autocorrelation matrix Φ and constant
covariance matrix Σf . The objective is to obtain a unique stable solution for the process xt
that satisfies equation (B.1).
The vector of policy instruments ut is linked to the vectors xt and ft by the following
1Unless I explicitly state otherwise, the variable and parameter definitions that I use in this section apply
only within this section.
2Klein (2000) uses a slightly more general definition and describes a variable as predetermined or backward-
looking if the one period-ahead prediction error ξt+1 = zt+1 − Etzt+1 is an exogenous martingale difference
process.
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expression:
ut = −Fxt −Gft +HEtxt+1. (B.3)
The policy rule in (B.3) is general and accommodates a variety of policy specifications that
respond to alternative combinations of contemporaneous realizations of endogenous and ex-
ogenous variables and to expected realizations of future endogenous variables. The advantage
of excluding the policy variables from the vector xt is that the matrices A, B, and C are
independent of the policy rule and do not need to be updated when alternative policy rules
are considered.
By using equation (B.3), I can rewrite the system described in equation (B.1) as:
A˜Etxt+1 = B˜xt + C˜ft, (B.4)
where:
A˜ = A−DH, (B.5)
B˜ = B −DF, (B.6)
C˜ = C −DG. (B.7)
The dynamic system represented by (B.4) is in the format required to implement the Klein
solution algorithm.
B.2 The Klein solution method
Klein (2000) has proposed a method for using a generalized Schur decomposition of the co-
efficient matrices A˜ and B˜ to solve the linear system represented by (B.4). Klein’s solution
method has an advantage over alternatives because it is computationally straightforward to
implement and, unlike the method of Blanchard and Kahn (1980), for example, it does not
require that the matrix A˜ is invertible.
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The solution algorithm begins by forming a complex generalized Schur decomposition of
the matrices A˜ and B˜ in (B.4). This produces a pair of unitary3 matrices (Q,Z) and a pair of
upper triangular matrices (S, T ) such that
QA˜Z = S, (B.8)
and
QB˜Z = T. (B.9)
Denote the diagonal elements of T and S by tii and sii for i = 1, . . . , n. The set of the ratios
of the diagonal elements of T and S – {λi = tii/sii : sii 6= 0} – forms the set of generalized
eigenvalues of A˜ and B˜.4 The matrices S and T can be constructed so that the eigenvalues
with modulus less than 1 are grouped first.5
Let n1 denote the number of generalized eigenvalues of A˜ and B˜ with modulus less than
1. The system in (B.4) will have a unique and stable solution if and only if the number of
eigenvalues with modulus less than 1 equals the number of predetermined variables; that is if
and only if n1 = nk.
6 Taking this to be the case, partition the n× n matrix Z:
Z =
 Z11 Z12
Z21 Z22
 , (B.10)
where Z11 is nk × nk so that it conforms with x1t. Next define the auxiliary variable yt as
3A complex matrix C is unitary if its inverse is equal to its Hermitian conjugate – the conjugate transpose
of C.
4Some λ ∈ C is a generalized eigenvalue of the matrix pair A and B if, for some nonzero vector x ∈ Cn,
Ax − λBx = 0. In the event sii = 0 for some i, the associated eigenvalue λi is set to infinity. The Matlab
program qz.m computes matrices Q,Z, S, T
5The Matlab program ordqz.m reforms the matrices of a Schur decomposition so that the eigenvalues are
grouped appropriately.
6It is necessary to ensure that no eigenvalues equal one in order to proceed with the algorithm. Like Klein,
I do not consider unit eigenvalues and the accompanying problem this presents.
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yt = Z
Hxt and rewrite the system (B.4) as:
SEtyt+1 = Tyt +QCft. (B.11)
The auxiliary variable yt can then be partitioned:
yt =
 st
vt
 , (B.12)
where st is an nk-dimensional vector and vt is an n− nk)-dimensional vector. And using this,
the system can be written as:
 S11 S12
0 S22
Et
 st+1
vt+1
 =
 T11 T12
0 T22

 st
vt
+
 Q1
Q2
Cft. (B.13)
The lower block of (B.13) contains the unstable components of the system. Klein shows how
this can be solved forward to obtain:
vt = Mft (B.14)
vec(M) = [( ΦT ⊗ S22
)−Inf ⊗ T22]−1 vec(Q2C). (B.15)
Using the solution for vt and (B.13), Klein obtains a solution for the stable block:
st+1 = S
−1
11 T11st + S
−1
11 [T12M − S12MΦ +Q1C] ft − Z−111 Z12Mεt+1, (B.16)
where εt+1 is the serially uncorrelated innovation process to ft+1.
Finally, Klein shows how to use the solutions for st and vt to recover the solutions for x1t
and x2t. These solutions given by:
x2t = Fx1t +Nft, (B.17)
x1t+1 = Px1t + Lft, (B.18)
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where:
F = Z21Z
−1
11 (B.19)
P = Z11S
−1
11 T11Z
−1
11 (B.20)
N = (Z22 − Z21Z−111 Z12)M, (B.21)
L = −Z11S−111 T11Z−111 Z12M + Z11S−111 [T12M − S12MΦ +Q1C] + Z12MΦ, (B.22)
taking as given the initial values x10 and f−1.
B.3 Solving the lending channel model with Klein’s method
It is straightforward to apply Klein’s solution method to the linearized equilibrium conditions
of the lending channel model. Equations (A.1) through (A.25) together with either equation
(A.26) or (A.27) in Appendix A comprise the linear equilibrium conditions of the model ex-
cluding a specification for monetary policy. To this set of equations, I append two additional
equations. First, I define a new variable sˆmt that satisfies:
0 = sˆmt − mˆnbrt . (B.23)
Including sˆmt in the model allows me to place mˆ
nbr
t in the vector of predetermined variables.
This is useful because it allows me to examine the case where monetary policy is specified as
a rule for nominal money growth without having to redefine the vector of endogenous state
variables.
Next, I append one of the following equations to the equilibrium conditions:
rˆnt+1 = r˜
n
t+1, (B.24)
mˆnbrt+1 = m˜t+1, (B.25)
where either r˜nt+1 or m˜t+1 is the monetary policy instrument that is included in the vector
ut in (B.1). Defining one of these additional variables is useful for two reasons. First, as
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the analysis in Section B.1 suggests, the variables in the vector ut are substituted out of the
system that is solved with the Klein method. This means that an additional computation is
required to recover the solution for the policy vector. By keeping rˆnt+1 and mˆ
nbr
t+1 in the vector
of endogenous variables, I avoid this additional step. Also, making use of equations (B.24) and
(B.25) allows me to study autoregressive policy specifications more easily. Use either (B.24)
or (B.25) to determine the elements of D in (B.1).
I define the vector of predetermined variables x1t as:
x1t ≡
[
kˆt, nˆt, qˆt−1, rˆnt , bˆt, mˆ
ex
t , ˆ¯rt, rˆ
ff
t ,m
nbr
t
]′
, (B.26)
and the vector of nonpredetermined variables x2t as
x2,t ≡
[
dˆt+1, rˆ
D
t+1, rˆ
B
t , rˆ
k
t , cˆt, hˆt, yˆt, ιˆt, wˆt, cˆ
e
t , ˆ¯ωt, λˆ
c
t , sˆ
m
t , Λˆ
b
t , Ξˆt, xˆt, pˆit
]′
. (B.27)
Now, I define the vector of endogenous variables as: xt = [x
′
1t, x
′
2t]
′. Using these definitions,
it is straightforward to refer to equations (A.1) through (A.25) to obtain the elements of the
coefficient matrices A and B.
Next, the variables in the forcing process ft are:
ft ≡ [zˆt, gˆt, vˆrt , vˆmt , uˆt, σˆω,t]′ , (B.28)
where zˆt is the aggregate productivity process, gˆt is government consumption, vˆ
r
t is a monetary
policy shock process when the central bank follows an interest rate rule, vˆmt is a monetary policy
shock process when the central bank follows a nominal money growth rule, uˆt is a shock to the
Philips curve, and σˆω,t is the variance process for the idiosyncratic shock to entrepreneurial
returns. The autocorrelation matrix for ft is:
Φf ≡ diag {ρz, ρg, ρvr, ρvm, ρu, ρσ} . (B.29)
The elements of the matrix C in equation (B.1) can be obtained by using the definition of ft
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and equations (A.1) through (A.2).
I consider two possible rules for monetary policy. The first is a linear feedback rule for the
nominal interest rate:
r˜nt+1 = ς
r
r rˆ
n
t + ς
r
pipˆit + ς
r
y yˆt + v
r
t . (B.30)
The second policy that I allow for is a linear feedback rule for the growth rate of nominal
nonborrowed reserves:
m˜t+1 = ς
m
mmˆ
nbr
t + ς
m
pi pˆit + ς
m
y yˆt + v
m
t . (B.31)
In the example that I consider, I set ςmm = 1 and ς
m
pi = −1 so that nominal money growth is
constant when the shock vmt is zero. Now equations (B.30) and (B.31) can be used to define
F , G, and H in (B.3).
Now with the matrices A, B, and C in equation (B.1) defined and D, F , and G (B.3)
defined, the matrices A˜, B˜, and C˜ in equation (B.4) can be determined. Now the lending
channel model can be solved using the methods described in the previous section.
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Appendix C
Computing the Flexible-price Equilibrium
I describe how to use Klein’s (2000) solution method to compute the output gap for a sticky-
price model with endogenous state variables. I follow Woodford (2003) and define the flexible-
price equilibrium as the equilibrium that is realized if prices are currently flexible and expected
to be flexible forever, while taking as given all exogenous and endogenous state variables.
Consider a rational expectations model with sticky prices that has the following linear
representation:
A
 X1t+1
EtX2t+1
 = B
 X1t
X2t
+ Cft, (C.1)
where X1t is a vector of predetermined or state variables, X2t is a vector of non-predetermined
variables, and ft is a vector of exogenous forcing variables. Under appropriate conditions
discussed in the previous appendix, the Klein solution method provides matrices P , L, F , and
N that describe the evolution of X1t+1 and X2t in terms of the state vectors X1t and ft:
X1t+1 = PX1t + Lft, (C.2)
X2t = FX1t +Nft. (C.3)
Note that, among other variables, output and inflation are embedded within X2t.
Now, consider the flexible-price analogue of the model above:
A˜
 Xflex1t+1
EtX
flex
2t+1
 = B˜
 Xflex1t
Xflex2t
+ C˜ft, (C.4)
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where Xflex1t denotes the collection of state variables in the flexible-price model and X
flex
2t the
set of forward-looking variables in the flexible price model. The flexible-price model can be
written so that X1t and X
flex
1t have the same elements. But since inflation and the average
price markup are constant in the flexible-price model,1 Xflex2t will have fewer elements than
Xflex2t . Applying the Klein algorithm produces matrices P˜ , L˜, F˜ , and N˜ such that:
Xflex1t+1 = P˜X
flex
1t + L˜ft, (C.5)
Xflex2t = F˜X
flex
1t + N˜ft. (C.6)
Now embedded within Xflex2t is a variable that I will identify with the flexible-price output.
The system represented by (C.5) and (C.6) describes the evolution of an economy with
flexible prices taking an initial state as given. If I replace Xflex1t with X1t on the left-hand side
of both (C.5) and (C.6), then I will have expressed the variables in the flexible-price system
as functions of the endogenous state of the sticky-price system. To accomplish this, I define:
Xsys1t ≡ X1t, (C.7)
and:
Xsys2t ≡

X2t
Xflext+1
Xflex2t
 . (C.8)
Then I define the transition matrices for Xsys1t+1 and X
sys
2t as:
P sys ≡ P, (C.9)
Lsys ≡ L, (C.10)
1Or at least inflation evolves independently of the real variables in the model.
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and:
F sys ≡

F
P˜
F˜
 , (C.11)
and:
N sys ≡

N
L˜
N˜
 . (C.12)
Now I can write evolution of the constructed system:
Xsys1t+1 = P
sysXsys1t + L
sysft, (C.13)
Xsys2t = F
sysXsys1t +N
sysft. (C.14)
The system (C.13) and (C.14) describes how the joint evolution of a sticky-price model and a
flexible-price model that evolves with the state from the sticky-price model. Sticky-price and
flexible-price output are both contained in Xsys2t and so computing the output gap defined by
(6.2) is a matter of straightforward arithmetic.
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Appendix D
Computing Unconditional Variances Using
the Klein Solution Method
Consider a linear dynamic system of the form of (B.4) that has been solved with the Klein
algorithm. The solution procedure produces matrices P , L, F , and N such that:
x1t+1 = Px1t + Lft, (D.1)
x2t = Fx1t +Nft, (D.2)
where ft is a VAR(1) process:
ft = Φft−1 + εt, (D.3)
and εt is vector white noise with covariance matrix Σε.
The unconditional covariance matrix for the exogenous process ft is found by first observ-
ing:
E
(
ftf
′
t
)
= E
[
(Φft−1 + εt)(f ′t−1Φ
′ + ε′t)
]
(D.4)
= ΦE
(
ft−1f ′t−1
)
Φ′ + E
(
εtε
′
t
)
. (D.5)
If the process ft is covariance stationary – as all processes in this appendix are presumed to
be – then the covariance matrix of ft, denoted by Σf , satisfies:
Σf − ΦΣfΦ′ = Σε, (D.6)
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where the solution for Σf is shown by Klein (2000) to be:
vec(Σf ) = [I − Φ⊗ Φ]−1 vec(Σε), (D.7)
as long as [I − Φ⊗ Φ]−1 exists. Note that if Φ is diagonal, then so is Σf with each element on
the diagonal equalling:
Σif =
1
1− ρ2i
σ2i , (D.8)
where Σif is the variance and ρi is the AR coefficient of the ith element of ft. The innovation
to the ith element of ft has variance σ
2
i .
By a similar set of calculations, I find that the covariance matrix of the predetermined
vector Σx1 ≡ E(x1tx′1t) satisfies:
Σx1 − PΣx1P ′ = PΣx1fL′ + LΣfx1P ′ + LΣfL′, (D.9)
where Σx1f ≡ E(x1tf ′t) and Σfx1 ≡ E(ftx′1t) are given by:
Σx1f − PΣx1fΦ′ = LΣfΦ′ (D.10)
Σfx1 − ΦΣfx1P ′ = ΦΣfL′. (D.11)
Similarly, the covariance matrix for the vector of non-predetermined variables Σx2 ≡ E(x2tx′2t)
can be written as:
Σx2 = FΣx1F
′ +NΣfN ′ + FΣx1fN
′ +NΣfx1F
′. (D.12)
This equation is already solved for Σx2 .
Finally, it is useful to know how to compute the variance of the difference between two
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elements – x2t(j) and x2t(k) – of x2t:
E [x2t(j)− x2t(k)]2 = E [x2t(j)]2 + E [x2t(k)]2 − 2E [x2t(j)x2t(k)] (D.13)
= Σx2(j, j) + Σx2(k, k)− 2Σx2(j, k), (D.14)
where Σx2(j, k) is the (j, k) element in the matrix Σx2 . I use this last result to compute the
variance of the output gap.
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Tables
Table 1: Calibrated values for the parameters of the lending channel model
Parameter Value Description
β 0.9902 household subjective discount factor
δ 0.0260 quarterly capital depreciation rate
α 0.30 capital share in output production
σc 2 household utility curvature parameter on C
σd 10.65 household utility curvature parameter on D/P
η 1 household utility curvature parameter on (1−H)
ζh 0.2041 household utility weight on C
ζd 0.0494 household utility weight on D/P
 5 elasticity of substitution among retail goods
χ 0.8 Calvo-pricing parameter
ϕ 0.25 capital adjustment cost parameter
Ω 0.9857 entrepreneur share of aggregate labor supply
γ 0.9695 share of entrepreneurs that survive each period
σ2ω 0.0738 distribution parameter for idiosyncratic shock ω
j
µ 0.1514 loan monitoring cost
Z 1 aggregate productivity
G 0.0689 government consumption
Zb 2.6610 productivity coefficient on loan production function
γb 0.0086 exponent on excess reserves in loan production
αb 1 curvature parameter on labor in loan production function
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Table 2: Calibrated values for the parameters governing the evolution of the exogenous
processes in the lending channel model
Shock AR coefficient Standard deviation
zˆt 0.945 0.0043
σˆω,t 0.850 0.1192
gˆt 0.945 0.0207
uˆt 0.723 0.0147
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Table 3: Optimized interest rate rule coefficients for models with an inflation shock (σ2u > 0);
rule class: rˆnt+1 = ςpipˆit + (ςy/4) yˆt
Coefficient on: Variance stats:
inflation (ςpi) output (ςy) interest (ςr) V (pi) V (y) V (r
n)
Lending chan. 1.90 0.00 - 0.1771 2.3123 0.6393
Bernanke et al. 1.93 0.00 - 0.1769 2.2616 0.6620
Baseline 2.53 0.00 - 0.1323 2.1469 0.8478
Notes: (1) The rule coefficients are restricted so that ςpi ∈ [0, 3] and (ςy/4) ∈ [0, 3], but the
coefficient constraints do not bind when the cost-push shock is included. (2) V (pi) denotes the
variance of inflation pˆit, V (y) denotes the variance of output relative to steady state yˆt, and
V (rn) denotes the variance of the nominal interest rate relative to the steady state rˆnt . (3) The
variance statistics for inflation and the nominal interest rate are reported in annual terms.
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Table 4: Optimized interest rate rule coefficients for models with an inflation shock (σ2u > 0);
rule class: rˆnt+1 = ςpipˆit + (ςy/4) yˆt + ςrrˆ
n
t
Coefficient on: Variance stats:
inflation (ςpi) output (ςy) interest (ςr) V (pi) V (y) V (r
n)
Lending chan. 0.0686 0.1041 2.89 0.1470 0.8161 0.0006
Bernanke et al.* 0.0270 0.00 1.0077 0.1481 0.9254 0.0014
Baseline 0.200 0.250 3.00 0.1247 0.9717 0.0039
Notes: (1) The rule coefficients are restricted so that ςpi ∈ [0, 3] and (ςy/4) ∈ [0, 3]. (2) A model
name marked with (*) indicates that the upper bound did not bind the optimized parameters
for that model. (3) V (pi) denotes the variance of inflation pˆit, V (y) denotes the variance of
output relative to steady state yˆt, and V (r
n) denotes the variance of the nominal interest rate
relative to the steady state rˆnt . (4) The variance statistics for inflation and the nominal interest
rate are reported in annual terms.
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Table 5: Optimized interest rate rule coefficients for models without an inflation shock
(σ2u = 0); rule class: rˆ
n
t+1 = ςpipˆit + (ςy/4) yˆt
Coefficient on: Variance stats (×10−3):
inflation (ςpi) output (ςy) interest (ςr) V (pi) V (y) V (r
n)
Lending chan. 3.00 0.00 - 0.0007 0.2005 0.0059
Bernanke et al. 3.00 0.00 - 0.0006 0.2158 0.0056
Baseline 3.00 0.00 - 0.0006 0.2020 0.0053
Notes: (1) The rule coefficients are restricted so that ςpi ∈ [0, 3] and (ςy/4) ∈ [0, 3]. (2) V (pi)
denotes the variance of inflation pˆit, V (y) denotes the variance of output relative to steady
state yˆt, and V (r
n) denotes the variance of the nominal interest rate relative to the steady
state rˆnt . (3) The variance statistics for inflation and the nominal interest rate are reported in
annual terms.
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Table 6: Optimized interest rate rule coefficients for models without an inflation shock
(σ2u = 0); rule class: rˆ
n
t+1 = ςpipˆit + (ςy/4) yˆt + ςrrˆ
n
t
Coefficient on: Variance stats (×10−3):
inflation (ςpi) output (ςy) interest (ςr) V (pi) V (y) V (r
n)
Lending chan. 3.00 0.00 1.67 0.0001 0.1978 0.0016
Bernanke et al. 3.00 0.0007 1.70 0.0001 0.2142 0.0015
Baseline 3.00 0.000 1.72 0.0001 0.2017 0.0013
Note: (1) The rule coefficients are restricted so that ςpi ∈ [0, 3] and (ςy/4) ∈ [0, 3]. (2) V (pi)
denotes the variance of inflation pˆit, V (y) denotes the variance of output relative to steady
state yˆt, and V (r
n) denotes the variance of the nominal interest rate relative to the steady
state rˆnt . (3) The variance statistics for inflation and the nominal interest rate are reported in
annual terms.
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Figures
Figure 1: Log-normal density functions for two random variables with expected values equal
to 1, but with different variances
ω
f(ω|µ, σ21)
f(ω|µ, σ22)
|
E(ω|σ2i ) = 1
Note: The figure depicts two log-normal density functions. By construction, each density
corresponds to a random variable ωi having an expected value of 1. That is, µi = −σ2i /2 for
each density. But since σ21 < σ
2
2, the density parameterized by σ
2
2 implies a greater variance
for the associated random variable ω than the density parameterized by σ21.
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Figure 2: Impulse responses to a monetary policy shock when monetary policy is set with a
rule for the growth rate of nonborrowed reserves
Notes: (1) The monetary policy rule used to produce the figure is mˆnbrt+1 = mˆ
nbr
t −pˆit+vˆmt , where
mˆnbrt denotes real nonborrowed reserves, pˆit is inflation and the autocorrelation coefficient for
the shock vˆmt is set to ρvm = 0.5. (2) In the legend, “lend chan” refers to the lending channel
model, “bgg” refers to the Bernanke et al. financial accelerator model and “base” to the baseline
model without financial frictions. (3) The vertical axes indicate percentage deviation from the
steady state while the horizontal units are quarters of a year. (4) The impulse responses for
interest rates, the return to capital, and inflation are reported in annualized terms.
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Figure 3: Impulse responses to a monetary policy shock when monetary policy is set with a
rule for the growth rate of nonborrowed reserves (continued)
Notes: (1) The monetary policy rule used to produce the figure is mˆnbrt+1 = mˆ
nbr
t −pˆit+vˆmt , where
mˆnbrt denotes real nonborrowed reserves, pˆit is inflation and the autocorrelation coefficient for
the shock vˆmt is set to ρvm = 0.5. (2) In the legend, “lend chan” refers to the lending channel
model, “bgg” refers to the Bernanke et al. financial accelerator model and “base” to the baseline
model without financial frictions. (3) The vertical axes indicate percentage deviation from the
steady state while the horizontal units are quarters of a year. (4) The impulse responses for
interest rates, the return to capital, and inflation are reported in annualized terms.
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Figure 4: Impulse responses to a monetary policy shock when monetary policy is set with a
rule for the growth rate of nonborrowed reserves (continued): variables specific to the lending
channel model
Notes: (1) The monetary policy rule used to produce the figure is mˆnbrt+1 = mˆ
nbr
t −pˆit+vˆmt , where
mˆnbrt denotes real nonborrowed reserves, pˆit is inflation and the autocorrelation coefficient for
the shock vˆmt is set to ρvm = 0.5. (2) The vertical axes indicate percentage deviation from the
steady state while the horizontal units are quarters of a year. (3) The impulse responses for
interest rates, the return to capital, and inflation are reported in annualized terms.
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Figure 5: Impulse responses to a monetary policy shock when monetary policy is set with a
rule for the nominal interest
Notes: (1) The monetary policy rule used to produce the figure is rˆnt+1 = 1.5pˆit + vˆ
r
t , where
rˆnt+1 denotes the nominal interest rate, pˆit is inflation and the autocorrelation coefficient for the
shock vˆrt is set to ρvr = 0.5. (2) In the legend, “lend chan” refers to the lending channel model,
“bgg” refers to the Bernanke et al. financial accelerator model and “base” to the baseline
model without financial frictions. (3) The vertical axes indicate percentage deviation from the
steady state while the horizontal units are quarters of a year. (4) The impulse responses for
interest rates, the return to capital, and inflation are reported in annualized terms.
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Figure 6: Impulse responses to a monetary policy shock when monetary policy is set with a
rule for the nominal interest (continued)
Notes: (1) The monetary policy rule used to produce the figure is rˆnt+1 = 1.5pˆit + vˆ
r
t , where
rˆnt+1 denotes the nominal interest rate, pˆit is inflation and the autocorrelation coefficient for the
shock vˆrt is set to ρvr = 0.5. (2) In the legend, “lend chan” refers to the lending channel model,
“bgg” refers to the Bernanke et al. financial accelerator model and “base” to the baseline
model without financial frictions. (3) The vertical axes indicate percentage deviation from the
steady state while the horizontal units are quarters of a year. (4) The impulse responses for
interest rates, the return to capital, and inflation are reported in annualized terms.
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Figure 7: Impulse responses to a monetary policy shock when monetary policy is set with a
rule for the nominal interest (continued): variables specific to the lending channel model
Notes: (1) The monetary policy rule used to produce the figure is rˆnt+1 = 1.5pˆit + vˆ
r
t , where
rˆnt+1 denotes the nominal interest rate, pˆit is inflation and the autocorrelation coefficient for
the shock vˆrt is set to ρvr = 0.5. (2) The vertical axes indicate percentage deviation from the
steady state while the horizontal units are quarters of a year. (3) The impulse responses for
interest rates, the return to capital, and inflation are reported in annualized terms.
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Figure 8: Impulse responses to a positive shock to the proportion of loans that default when
monetary policy follows an interest rate rule
Notes: (1) The autocorrelation coefficient for the shock to loan defaults is set to ρσ = 0.850.
(2) The monetary policy rule used to produce the figure is rˆnt+1 = 1.5pˆit, where rˆ
n
t+1 denotes the
nominal interest rate and pˆit is inflation. (3) In the legend, “lend chan” refers to the lending
channel model, “bgg” refers to the Bernanke et al. financial accelerator model and “base” to the
baseline model without financial frictions. (4) The vertical axes indicate percentage deviation
from the steady state while the horizontal units are quarters of a year. (5) The impulse
responses for interest rates, the return to capital, and inflation are reported in annualized
terms.
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Figure 9: Impulse responses to a positive shock to the proportion of loans that default when
monetary policy follows an interest rate rule (continued)
Notes: (1) The autocorrelation coefficient for the shock to loan defaults is set to ρσ = 0.850.
(2) The monetary policy rule used to produce the figure is rˆnt+1 = 1.5pˆit, where rˆ
n
t+1 denotes the
nominal interest rate and pˆit is inflation. (3) In the legend, “lend chan” refers to the lending
channel model, “bgg” refers to the Bernanke et al. financial accelerator model and “base” to the
baseline model without financial frictions. (4) The vertical axes indicate percentage deviation
from the steady state while the horizontal units are quarters of a year. (5) The impulse
responses for interest rates, the return to capital, and inflation are reported in annualized
terms.
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Figure 10: Impulse responses to a positive shock to the proportion of loans that default when
monetary policy follows an interest rate rule (continued): variables specific to the lending
channel model
Notes: (1) The autocorrelation coefficient for the shock to loan defaults is set to ρσ = 0.850.
(2) The monetary policy rule used to produce the figure is rˆnt+1 = 1.5pˆit, where rˆ
n
t+1 denotes the
nominal interest rate and pˆit is inflation. (3) The vertical axes indicate percentage deviation
from the steady state while the horizontal units are quarters of a year. (4) The impulse
responses for interest rates, the return to capital, and inflation are reported in annualized
terms.
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Figure 11: Impulse responses to a shock to government consumption when monetary policy
follows a nominal interest rate rule
Notes: (1) The autocorrelation coefficient for the shock to government consumption is set to
ρg = 0.945. (2) The monetary policy rule used to produce the figure is rˆ
n
t+1 = 1.5pˆit, where
rˆnt+1 denotes the nominal interest rate and pˆit is inflation. (3) In the legend, “lend chan” refers
to the lending channel model, “bgg” refers to the Bernanke et al. financial accelerator model
and “base” to the baseline model without financial frictions. (4) The vertical axes indicate
percentage deviation from the steady state while the horizontal units are quarters of a year.
(5) The impulse responses for interest rates, the return to capital, and inflation are reported
in annualized terms.
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Figure 12: Impulse responses to a shock to government consumption when monetary policy
follows a nominal interest rate rule (continued)
Notes: (1) The autocorrelation coefficient for the shock to government consumption is set to
ρg = 0.945. (2) The monetary policy rule used to produce the figure is rˆ
n
t+1 = 1.5pˆit, where
rˆnt+1 denotes the nominal interest rate and pˆit is inflation. (3) In the legend, “lend chan” refers
to the lending channel model, “bgg” refers to the Bernanke et al. financial accelerator model
and “base” to the baseline model without financial frictions. (4) The vertical axes indicate
percentage deviation from the steady state while the horizontal units are quarters of a year.
(5) The impulse responses for interest rates, the return to capital, and inflation are reported
in annualized terms.
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Figure 13: Impulse responses to a shock to government consumption when monetary policy
follows a nominal interest rate rule (continued): variables specific to the lending channel model
Notes: (1) The autocorrelation coefficient for the shock to government consumption is set
to ρg = 0.945. (2) The monetary policy rule used to produce the figure is rˆ
n
t+1 = 1.5pˆit,
where rˆnt+1 denotes the nominal interest rate and pˆit is inflation. (3) The vertical axes indicate
percentage deviation from the steady state while the horizontal units are quarters of a year.
(4) The impulse responses for interest rates, the return to capital, and inflation are reported
in annualized terms.
129
Figure 14: Impulse responses to a shock to aggregate productivity when monetary policy
follows a nominal interest rate rule
Notes: (1) The autocorrelation coefficient for the shock to productivity is set to ρz = 0.945.
(2) The monetary policy rule used to produce the figure is rˆnt+1 = 1.5pˆit, where rˆ
n
t+1 denotes the
nominal interest rate and pˆit is inflation. (3) In the legend, “lend chan” refers to the lending
channel model, “bgg” refers to the Bernanke et al. financial accelerator model and “base” to the
baseline model without financial frictions. (4) The vertical axes indicate percentage deviation
from the steady state while the horizontal units are quarters of a year. (5) The impulse
responses for interest rates, the return to capital, and inflation are reported in annualized
terms.
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Figure 15: Impulse responses to a shock to aggregate productivity when monetary policy
follows a nominal interest rate rule (continued)
Notes: (1) The autocorrelation coefficient for the shock to productivity is set to ρz = 0.945.
(2) The monetary policy rule used to produce the figure is rˆnt+1 = 1.5pˆit, where rˆ
n
t+1 denotes the
nominal interest rate and pˆit is inflation. (3) In the legend, “lend chan” refers to the lending
channel model, “bgg” refers to the Bernanke et al. financial accelerator model and “base” to the
baseline model without financial frictions. (4) The vertical axes indicate percentage deviation
from the steady state while the horizontal units are quarters of a year. (5) The impulse
responses for interest rates, the return to capital, and inflation are reported in annualized
terms.
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Figure 16: Impulse responses to a shock to aggregate productivity when monetary policy
follows a nominal interest rate rule (continued): variables specific to the lending channel model
Notes: (1) The autocorrelation coefficient for the shock to productivity is set to ρz = 0.945.
(2) The monetary policy rule used to produce the figure is rˆnt+1 = 1.5pˆit, where rˆ
n
t+1 denotes the
nominal interest rate and pˆit is inflation. (3) The vertical axes indicate percentage deviation
from the steady state while the horizontal units are quarters of a year. (4) The impulse
responses for interest rates, the return to capital, and inflation are reported in annualized
terms.
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Figure 17: Region of instability for the lending channel model under different combinations of
ςpi and (ςy/4) assuming that monetary policy is set using the policy rule rˆ
n
t+1 = ςpipˆit+(ςy/4) yˆt.
Note: The points in the figure correspond to monetary policies – combinations of ςpi and
(ςy/4) – that imply explosive equilibria in the lending channel model.
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Figure 18: Inflation variance in the lending channel model without an inflation shock plotted
as a function of the coefficients on inflation and output in the monetary policy rule
Notes: (1) The plot depicts the unconditional variance of inflation in the lending channel
model as a function of ςpi and (ςy/4) in the policy rule rˆ
n
t+1 = ςpipˆit+(ςy/4) yˆt, where pˆit denotes
inflation and yˆt denotes the log-deviation of output from its steady state. (2) Only policies
that induce a unique and stable equilibrium are considered.
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Figure 19: Output gap variance in the lending channel model without an inflation shock
plotted as a function of the coefficients on inflation and output in the monetary policy rule
Notes: (1) The plot depicts the unconditional variance of the output gap in the lending channel
model as a function of ςpi and (ςy/4) in the policy rule rˆ
n
t+1 = ςpipˆit+(ςy/4) yˆt, where pˆit denotes
inflation and yˆt denotes the log-deviation of output from its steady state. (2) Only policies
that induce a unique and stable equilibrium are considered.
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Figure 20: Output variance in the lending channel model without an inflation shock plotted
as a function of the coefficients on inflation and output in the monetary policy rule
Notes: (1) The plot depicts the unconditional variance of output relative to the steady state in
the lending channel model as a function of ςpi and (ςy/4) in the policy rule rˆ
n
t+1 = ςpipˆit+(ςy/4) yˆt,
where pˆit denotes inflation and yˆt denotes the log-deviation of output from its steady state. (2)
Only policies that induce a unique and stable equilibrium are considered.
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Figure 21: Nominal interest rate variance in the lending channel model without an inflation
shock plotted as a function of the coefficients on inflation and output in the monetary policy
rule
Notes: (1) The plot depicts the unconditional variance of the nominal interest rate in the
lending channel model as a function of ςpi and (ςy/4) in the policy rule rˆ
n
t+1 = ςpipˆit + (ςy/4) yˆt,
where pˆit denotes inflation and yˆt denotes the log-deviation of output from its steady state. (2)
Only policies that induce a unique and stable equilibrium are considered.
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Figure 22: Central bank loss function in the lending channel model without an inflation shock
plotted as a function of the coefficients on inflation and output in the monetary policy rule
Notes: (1) The plot depicts the central bank’s loss function as a function of ςpi and (ςy/4) in the
policy rule rˆnt+1 = ςpipˆit + (ςy/4) yˆt, where pˆit denotes inflation and yˆt denotes the log-deviation
of output from its steady state. (2) Only policies that induce a unique and stable equilibrium
are considered.
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Figure 23: Inflation variance in the lending channel model with an inflation shock plotted as
a function of the coefficients on inflation and output in the monetary policy rule
Notes: (1) The plot depicts the unconditional variance of the inflation rate in the lending
channel model as a function of ςpi and (ςy/4) in the policy rule rˆ
n
t+1 = ςpipˆit + (ςy/4) yˆt, where
pˆit denotes inflation and yˆt denotes the log-deviation of output from its steady state. (2) Only
policies that induce a unique and stable equilibrium are considered.
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Figure 24: Output gap variance in the lending channel model with an inflation shock plotted
as a function of the coefficients on inflation and output in the monetary policy rule
Notes: (1) The plot depicts the unconditional variance of the output gap in the lending channel
model as a function of ςpi and (ςy/4) in the policy rule rˆ
n
t+1 = ςpipˆit+(ςy/4) yˆt, where pˆit denotes
inflation and yˆt denotes the log-deviation of output from its steady state. (2) Only policies
that induce a unique and stable equilibrium are considered.
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Figure 25: Output variance in the lending channel model with an inflation shock plotted as
a function of the coefficients on inflation and output in the monetary policy rule
Notes: (1) The plot depicts the unconditional variance of output relative to its steady state in
the lending channel model as a function of ςpi and (ςy/4) in the policy rule rˆ
n
t+1 = ςpipˆit+(ςy/4) yˆt,
where pˆit denotes inflation and yˆt denotes the log-deviation of output from its steady state. (2)
Only policies that induce a unique and stable equilibrium are considered.
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Figure 26: Nominal interest rate variance in the lending channel model with an inflation
shock plotted as a function of the coefficients on inflation and output in the monetary policy
rule
Notes: (1) The plot depicts the unconditional variance of the nominal interest rate in the
lending channel model as a function of ςpi and (ςy/4) in the policy rule rˆ
n
t+1 = ςpipˆit + (ςy/4) yˆt,
where pˆit denotes inflation and yˆt denotes the log-deviation of output from its steady state. (2)
Only policies that induce a unique and stable equilibrium are considered.
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Figure 27: Central bank loss function in the lending channel model with an inflation shock
plotted as a function of the coefficients on inflation and output in the monetary policy rule
Notes: (1) The plot depicts the central bank’s loss function in the lending channel model as a
function of ςpi and (ςy/4) in the policy rule rˆ
n
t+1 = ςpipˆit + (ςy/4) yˆt, where pˆit denotes inflation
and yˆt denotes the log-deviation of output from its steady state. (2) Only policies that induce
a unique and stable equilibrium are considered.
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